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upposE that you, as a reasonable man, are asked whether the follow-
ing two sets of rules mean exactly the same thing. If they do and if you
intend to communicate your message as effectively as possible, which
of the two sets would you choose to state the organizational rules of your
law school?
Set 1
A. The financial committee shall be
chosen from among the general com-
mittee.
B. No one shall be a member of both
the general and library committees
unless he is also on the financial com-
mittee.
C. No member of the library committee
shall be on the financial committee.,
Set 2
A. The financial committee shall be
chosen from among the general com-
mittee.
B. No member of the general committee
shall be on the library committee.
We suspect that most readers will have little difficulty in deciding the sec-
ond question; but even after careful reading of the two sets of rules, they will
remain a little puzzled as to whether both sets say the same thing. We further
suspect that lawyers waste a great deal of their mental energy by using inade-
quate and inappropriate intellectual tools to figure out similar logical problems
in their everyday work. A symbolic logician could quickly ascertain that the
two sets of rules are equivalent and relieve his mind to focus on the more im-
portant problem of deciding which is the more appropriate choice. Since law
* Social Science Research Council Fellow, Yale Law School. Member Connecticut Bar.
t Member, New York Bar.
' This example is given in Berkeley, The Algebra of States and Events, 78 Scientific Month-
ly 232 (1954).
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schools do not yet offer training in symbolic logic, most lawyers who read this
article are probably not acquainted with this tool. It therefore would not be ap-
propriate to include here a formal proof in symbolic notation of the equivalence
of these two sets of rules. However, to persuade those who may doubt this as-
serted equivalence, perhaps an alternative technique of symbolic logic-the
truth table analysis-will be convincing. A modified analysis- of this type in-
dicates that there are just eight possible states of affairs dealt with by these
two sets of rules, and in every state of affairs each set of rules has the same
effect. This is shown in Table 1. For the lawyer untrained in symbolic logic
some of the clarity and precision of analysis afforded by this incisive analytical
tool can be achieved by using the method of drafting and interpretation illus-
TABLE I
States of Affairs Effects
A person is a member of the
following committees: By Stt I By Set 2
1. financial general library not permitted not permitted
2. financial general permitted permitted
3. financial library not permitted not permitted
4. financial not permitted not permitted
5. general library not permitted not permitted
6. general permitted permitted
7. library permitted permitted
8. none permitted permitted
trated in this article. To understand this method a lawyer does not need to have
any training in symbolic logic. Essentially, the method suggested here is an
effort to adapt some of the elementary notions of symbolic logic so that they
can be used by the practicing attorney to help clarify the intended meanings
of statements in legal documents. This method, which is called "systematic-
pulverization," has been described in detail in a previous article.3 A thorough
understanding of systematic-pulverization as explained in that article is a pre-
requisite for section I of this article. The system of logic upon which systematic-
pulverization is based deals with the logical connections expressed in ordinary
English by such words as "and," "or," "if ... then... " and "not." The
technical names of the logical connections expressed by these words and the
2 This technique rapidly becomes cumbersome as the number of factors increases. The lines
in the truth-table increase exponentially with the number of factors. L = 2', where L is the
number of lines and n is the number of factors. For example, a situation involving ten factors
would require a 1024-line truth-table; a fifteen-factor situation, a 32,768-line truth-table. In
such situations the analysis would be too unwieldy unless the problem were programmed for
a digital computer. See note 15 infra.
3 Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor Edged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting Legal Docu-
ments, 66 Yale L. J. 833 (1957).
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symbols that represent them in systematically-pulverized form are conjunc-
tion (&), inclusive disjunction (&OR), exclusive disjunction (OR), implication
( ), coimplication ( ) and negation (NOT). For conven-
ience of reference a brief summary and illustration of systematic-pulverization
is set forth in Table 2.
TABLE 2
LOGtIL
CONNE CTIX, E SYMBOL
EX!MPLES
Ordinary Verbal Form Systematically-Pulveized Form
Conjunction 1. The six logical connectives dealt The six logical connec-
& 2. with here are conjunction, ex- tives dealt with here are
clusive disjunction, inclusive 1. conjunction
disjunction, negation, impli- & 2. exclusive disjunction
tion and coimplication. & 3. inclusive disjunction
& 4. negation
& 5. implication
& 6. coimplication
Exclusive 1- A person either understands A person either
Disjunction OR them or he does not. 1-does
2- OR
2-does NOT
understand them.
Inclusive 1) Exclusive disjunction and/or 1) Exclusive dis-
Disjunction 2) &OR inclusive disjunction may junction
prove tricky for a while, but 2) &OR inclusive dis-
one soon learns to distinguish junction
them. may prove tricky for a
while, but one soon learns
to distinguish them.
Negation NOT The explanation here should not The explanation here
be hard to understand, should NOT be hard to
understand.
Implication I. If a person can read, then he I. A person can read
should be able to under-
2. stand it very easily. 2. HE SHOULD BE
ABLE TO UNDER-
STAND IT VERY
EASILY.
Coimplication 1. If, and only if, a person can 1. A person can read
read, then he should be able
2. to understand it very easily. 2. HE SHOULD BE
ABLE TO UNDER-
STAND IT VERY
EASILY.
1. Antecedent
2. CONSEQUENT
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To illustrate the usefulness of systematic-pulverization it will be helpful to
consider a horrible example of draftsmanship, which is, unfortunately, similar in
in form to a part of one of the most important federal statutes. Suppose that
one is asked what the following statement means:
A reader should be willing to give his careful attention to any knowledge that will
become valuable to him during the coming year. In the case of a reader other than a
lawyer (1) this assertion does not apply to knowledge that is not about drafting; and
(2) where the knowledge that is not about drafting will become valuable during the
coming year the gain resulting therefrom will be considered here to be a gain that re-
quires so long to achieve that it is probably not worth the time. For purposes of the
previous sentence the phrase "knowledge that is not about drafting" refers to knowl-
edge other than knowledge that is professionally or financially useful (as the case may
be) in connection with the reader's writing or drafting; or knowledge the gain from
the value of which will be sustained in the reader's writing or drafting. Any skill of ex-
pression achieved by a reader (other than a lawyer) as a result of the information that
he acquires, discovers or derives from an understanding of this article's nonlegal in-
formation the benefits of which could be useful to improve even the writing or drafting
of this article shall be regarded as knowledge becoming valuable during the coming
year for purposes of this paragraph (except that the second and third sentences do not
apply) but only if the information in this article in its effect upon increasing skill of
expression was valuable (without regard to that particular reader's discovery, acquisi-
tion or derivation) at the time that such skill of expression would have been achieved
by that reader.
4
Hardly anyone would blame a reader for deserting the author of such un-
duly complex writing. However, there are occasions when lawyers are forced
to try to unravel what is meant in statements that are just as awkwardly con-
structed. This article will attempt to offer some help for doing that job. In
addition, it will attempt to be more than just a tirade against bad draftsman-
ship. It will illustrate technique for achieving more clarity in legal drafting.
Tax specialists may detect a certain similarity between the hypothetical
paragraph and certain portions of Section 166 (BAD DEBTS) of the Internal
Revenue Code. The similarity, which is one of formal structure, becomes more
apparent when the two statements are written side by side.
Section 166 (a)(1), (d) and (f) The Hypothetical
of the Internal Revenue Code Paragraph
(a) GENERAL RULE
(1) WHOLLY WORTHLESS.
DEBTS
There shall be allowed as a de- A reader should be willing to give his care-
duction ful attention to
any debt which becomes worth- any knowledge that will become valuable
less during the taxable year to him during the coming year
Hereafter this entire paragraph shall be referred to as the "hypothetical paragraph."
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(d) NONBUSINESS DEBTS
(1) GENERAL RULE
In the case of a taxpayer other
than a corporation
(A) subsection (a) shall not ap-
ply to any nonbusiness
debts; and
(B) where any nonbusiness debt
becomes worthless during
the taxable year
the loss resulting therefrom
shall be considered a loss
from the sale or exchange,
during the taxable year, of
a capital asset held for not
more than six months.
(2) NONBUSINESS DEBT DE-
FINED
For purposes of paragraph (1)
the term "nonbusiness debt"
means a debt other than
(A) a debt created or acquired
(as the case may be)
in connection with the tax-
payer's trade or business; or
(B) a debt the loss from the
worthlessness of which
is incurred in the taxpayer's
trade or business
(f) GUARANTOR OF CERTAIN
NONCORPORATE OBLIGA-
TIONS
A payment by the taxpayer (other
than a corporation)
in discharge of part or all of his obli-
gation
as a guarantor, endorser or indemni-
tor of a noncorporate obligation
the proceeds of which were used in
the trade or business of the borrower
shall be treated as a debt becoming
worthless within such taxable year
for purposes of this section
(except that subsection (d) does not
apply)
In the case of a reader other than a lawyer
(I) this assertion does not apply to
knowledge that is not about draft-
ing; and
(2) where the knowledge that is not about
drafting will become valuable during
the coming year
the gain resulting therefrom will be
considered here to be a gain that re-
quires so long to achieve that it is
probably not worth the time.
For purposes of the previous sentence the
phrase "knowledge that is not about
drafting" refers to knowledge other than
knowledge that is professionally or finan-
cially useful (as the case may be)
in connection with the reader's writing or
drafting; or
knowledge the gain from the value of
which
will be sustained in the reader's writing or
drafting.
Any skill of expression achieved by a read-
er (other than a lawyer)
as a result of the information
that he acquires, discovers or derives from
an understanding of this article's non-
legal information
the benefits of which could be used to im-
prove even the writing or drafting of this
article
shall be regarded as knowledge becoming
valuable during the coming year for pur-
poses of this paragraph
(except that the second and third sen-
tences do not apply)
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Section 166 (a)(1), (d) and (f) of the The Hypothetical Paragraph-
Internal Revenue Code-Continued Continued
but only if the obligation of the bor- but only if the information in this article
rower to the person to whom such in its effect upon increasing skill of ex-
payment was made was worthless pression was valuable
(without regard to such guaranty, (without regard to that particular read-
endorsement or indemnity) er's discovery, acquisition or derivation)
at the time of such payment.5  at the time that such skill of expression
would have been achieved by that reader.
In Section 166 and in the hypothetical paragraph it is not the meaning of
the words (semantics) that is the chief cause of making the two statements so
difficult to understand. It is their complex logical structure (syntax) that must
shoulder the major portion of the blame. If there is any lingering doubt that
meaning has been effectively hidden in a tangle of complex construction, per-
haps that doubt can be dispelled by attempting to answer the following ques-
tions on the basis of what is stated in the hypothetical paragraph.6
(For answering all of these questions assume that there is a rule of interpre-
tation to the effect that if the hypothetical paragraph does not explicitly state
that a given reader should give his careful attention to knowledge that will be-
come valuable during the coming year, then that reader should not do so. This
is equivalent to the rule under the Internal Revenue Code that if the statute
does not explicitly state that an item is deductible from gross income, then that
item is not deductible.)
1. Should all lawyer-readers be willing to give their close attention to knowledge that
will become valuable to them during the coming year even if that knowledge is not
financially useful in connection with their drafting?
2. Should all nonlawyer-readers be willing to give their close attention to all knowl-
edge that will become valuable to them during the coming year?
3. If this article contains knowledge that is not about drafting which will become valu-
able to a nonlawyer-reader during the coming year, but this information is nonlegal
in nature and it would not help to improve the writing or drafting of this article,
should such a reader be willing to give his close attention to this article? Should such
a reader be unwilling to give his close attention to this article?
5 The parallel sets of terms in the two statements are the following:
debt knowledge
worthless valuable
the taxable year the coning year
taxpayer reader
corporation lawyer
nonbusiness not about drafting
loss gain
trade or business writing or drafting
pament skill of expressionoblgation information
guarantor discoversendorser acquires
indemnitor derives
noncorporate nonlegal
borrower this article
6 If the reader wishes to compare his answers to those we suggest, see page 19 infra.
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4. If the reader is not a lawyer and the knowledge contained in this article is not only
not about drafting, but it also will not become valuable to the reader during the com-
ing year, does the hypothetical paragraph state that such a reader should give this
article his careful attention? Does it state that such a reader should not give this
article his careful attention? Does it state that the gain from such knowledge is
considered to require so long to achieve that it is probably not worth the time?
5. Suppose that:
(1) the reader is not a la~wer
(2) this article contains knowledge that will become valuable to the reader during
the coming year
(3) such knowledge will not be professionally or financially useful in connection
with the reader's writing or drafting
(4) the gain from such knowledge will not be sustained in the reader's writing or
drafting
(5) the reader will increase his skill of oral expression from the nonlegal informa-
tion he acquires from this article
(6) whether or not the nonlegal information in this article is in fact discovered by
the reader, such information is nevertheless valuable to others at the time that
this particular reader could have achieved such skill of oral expression
(7) the nonlegal information in this article can be of help in improving the writing
or drafting of this article itself.
Under these conditions is the article probably not worth the time that it will take
to read it? Should such a reader give his careful attention to this article?
Figuring out the answers to these questions should demonstrate that a con-
siderable amount of careful analysis in interpreting the hypothetical paragraph
is required in order to uncover the appropriate answers. If the hypothetical
paragraph were complicated still further so that it paralleled all of Section 166,
instead of only part; the resulting statement would indeed make large demands
upon the reader's ability to comprehend-as well as impinging drastically upon
his patience.
It is suggested that the mental energy expended in obtaining such answers,
and the probability of mistake in doing so, could be reduced by drafting this
hypothetical paragraph in a more systematic manner. This article is an effort to
further develop a systematic method of drafting and interpretation.
In the first section of this article, "systematic-pulverization" is used to un-
tangle the logical connections in Sections 162 (Expenses), 165 (Losses), and 166
(Bad Debts) of the Internal Revenue Code and to simplify these three com-
plex sections by expressing them more systematically. This part of the article
analyzes the syntax of written statements, describing the methods of express-
ing the logical relationships between constituent parts of a statement in more
orderly fashion. The second section deals with the semantic problem of assign-
ing the appropriate meaning to a word or phrase in a given context. This is a
problem with both logical and descriptive words. An approach to interpreta-
tion that has the important earmarks of scientific method is suggested and
illustrated.
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I. SYSTEIMATIC-PULVERIZATION OF SECTIONS 162 (EXPENSES),
165 (LossEs), AND 166 (BAD DEBTS)
In essence, systematic-pulverization is putting a statement into more order-
ly form by highlighting the logical connectives between its various constituent
elements. Of course, in most statements two or more logical connectives occur
at the same time. The hypothetical paragraph is an example of a combination
of many logical connectives. The interpretation of these logical connectives
can be illustrated by an analysis of the logical form of the hypothetical para-
graph. It will be helpful to consider how the hypothetical paragraph will look
in systematically-pulverized form as a first step in the task of transforming
Sections 162, 165, and 166 of the Internal Revenue Code into such form.7
The process of transforming an ordinary statement in a natural language
into systematically-pulverized form may be conveniently classified into four
steps:
A. Pulverize the statement into its constituent elements.
B. Rearrange the constituent elements into approximately the form of an implication
(or coimplication).
C. Determine the appropriate schematic form by ascertaining the appropriate logical
connection intended by the words used in the statement.
D. Write the statement in systematically-pulverized form.
This process can be illustrated on the first sentence of the hypothetical para-
graph which reads: "A reader should be willing to give his careful attention to
any knowledge that will become valuable to him during the coming year."
A. -Pulverize into constituent elements:
P = Knowledge will become valuable to a reader during the coming year
Q = THAT READER SHOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE HIS CAREFUL
ATTENTION TO SUCH KNOWLEDGE.
B. Rearrange into the form of an implication:
IF knowledge will become valuable to a reader during the coming year, THEN
that reader should be willing to give his careful attention to such knowledge.
C. Determine the schematic form by ascertaining the logical connections
intended:
In this case there is only one set of logical words to be interpreted. The question
is which the "if ... then. . ." indicates: implication or coimplication. Our evalu-
ation is that it is intended here to indicate implication, so the schematic form is:
1. p
2. Q
7 The hypothetical paragraph has the virtue of being slightly more simple in its formal
structure. Becoming familiar with the pulverizing process is probably achieved more readily
if one begins with such a statement rather than with a more complex one. Also, since the
hypothetical paragraph is similar to part of Section 166, the analysis of it will be helpful in
systematically pulverizing Section 166 later.
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D. Express in systematically-pulverized form:
1. Knowledge will become valuable to a reader during the coming year
2. THAT READER SHOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE HIS CAREFUL AT-
TENTION TO SUCH KNOWLEDGE.
The remaining sentences of the hypothetical paragraph add additional qualify-
ing conditions which must be satisfied before it may be concluded that the read-
er should be willing to give his careful attention to such knowledge. The process
of pulverizing and determining what logical relationships were intended to
join the various constituent elements is done in a similar manner for the re-
maining sentences. One convenient pulverization of the entire hypothetical
paragraph and its corresponding portion of Section 166 is that shown in Table 3.
The process of determining just which logical relationship is intended to
prevail between various constituents is not automatic. Often there will be some
doubt as to which of two logical connectives is the appropriate choice. Such a
decision should be made according to some criteria. Section II is an effort to
develop a systematic approach to this problem of interpretation. Once the ap-
propriate logical relationships have been ascertained the symbolic logician can
manipulate the complicated statement into more simple propositions accord-
ing to precise rules of analysis. He knows that in the logical system upon which
systematic-pulverization is based every statement, no matter how complex,
can be reduced to the conjunction of a set of simple propositions. These con-
joined simple propositions, which are equivalent to the complex statement, are
here called "subsidiary propositions." The detailed specification of the sub-
sidiary propositions of statements 1.0 through 6.0 in the next few pages is in-
cluded here to give readers who are not trained in modem logic some practice
in determining the subsidiary propositions of a complex statement. The sub-
sidiary propositions of statements 1.0 through 6.0 can be deduced by applying
one or more of the following six elementary theorems one or more times:
T1. Given that "P IMPLIES (Q1 and Q2)," it may be concluded that "P IM-
PLIES QI" and "P IMPLIES Q2."
T2. Given that "P COIMPLIES Q," it may be concluded that "P IMPLIES Q"
and "Q IMPLIES P."
T3. Given that "(P1 &OR P2) IMPLIES Q," it may be concluded that "P1 IM-
PLIES Q" and "P2 IMPLIES Q."
T4. Given that "P IMPLIES Q," it may be concluded that "NOT Q IMPLIES
NOT P."
T5. Given that "NOT (P1 &OR P2) IMPLIES Q," it may be concluded that "NOT
P1 AND NOT P2 IMPLIES Q."
T6. Given that "P1 IMPLIES that (P2 IMPLIES Q)," it may be concluded that
"P1 AND P2 IMPLIES Q."
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TABLE 3
Letters
P
QlP1Q1P2
Q1P32
QP33
Q1P34
Q1Q
Q2P3
Q2Q
RI
R2
S
Section 166 (a)(1), (d) and (f)
A debt becomes worthless during the
taxable year
the taxpayer is a corporation
that debt is a business debt
a payment by that taxpayer is made
in discharge of part OR all of his
obligation as a guarantor &OR en-
dorser &OR indemnitor of a non-
corporate obligation
the proceeds of that noncorporate ob-
ligation were used in the trade
&OR business of the borrower
that noncorporate obligation of the
borrower to the person to whom
the payment was made was worth-
less (without regard to that guaran-
ty &OR endorsement &OR indem-
nity) at the time of that payment
THAT DEBT SHALL BE AL-
LOWED AS A DEDUCTION
one of the conditions of subsection
2.1.3 is NOT satisfied
THE LOSS RESULTING THERE-
FROM SHALL BE CONSID-
ERED A LOSS FROM THE
SALE &OR EXCHANGE, DUR-
ING THE TAXABLE YEAR,
OF A CAPITAL ASSET HELD
FOR NOT MORE THAN SIX
MONTHS
A debt is created &OR acquired in
connection with a taxpayer's trade
&OR business
the loss from the worthlessness of a
debt is incurred in the taxpayer's
trade &OR business
THAT DEBT IS A BUSINESS
DEBT FOR PURPOSES OF
SUBSECTION 1.0
8 Notice that Q1P32 might be further pulverized into still more simple propositions:
Q1P321 = skill of expression is achieved by that reader as a result of the information he
discovers from an understanding of this article's nonlegal information
QlP322 = skill of expression is achieved by that reader as a result of the information he
acquires from an understanding of this article's nonlegal information
Q1P323 = skill of expression is achieved by that reader as a result of the information he
derives from an understanding of this article's nonlegal information.
Just how far it is appropriate to continue the process of pulverizing a statement into more
and more simple constituents varies from case to case and depends on the judgment of the
analyst. On this each analyst must exercise his own.
The Hypothetical Paragraph
Knowledge will become valuable to a
reader during the coming year
that reader is a lawyer
that knowledge is about drafting
skill of expression is achieved by that
reader as a result of the information
he discovers &OR acquires &OR de-
rives from an understanding of this
article's nonlegal information s
the benefits of this article's nonlegal in-
formation could be used to improve
even the writing &OR drafting of this
article
that nonlegal information of this article
in its effect upon increasing skill of
expression was valuable (without re-
gard to that particular reader's dis-
covery &OR acquisition &OR deriva-
tion) at the time that such skill of
expression was achieved by that
reader
THAT READER SHOULD BE
WILLING TO GIVE HIS CARE-
FUL ATTENTION TO SUCH
KNOWLEDGE
one of the conditions of subsection 2.1.3
is NOT satisfied
THE GAIN RESULTING THERE-
FROM WILL BE CONSIDERED
HERE TO BE A GAIN THAT RE-
QUIRES SO LONG TO ACHIEVE
THAT IT IS PROBABLY NOT
WORTH THE TIME
Knowledge is financially &OR profes-
sionally useful in connection with a
reader's writing &OR drafting
the gain from the value of knowledge is
sustained in the reader's writing
&OR drafting
THAT KNOWLEDGE IS KNOWL-
EDGE ABOUT DRAFTING FOR
PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION 1.0
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A step-by-step dissection of the logical structure of the hypothetical para-
graph reveals a complicated set of logical connectives. First, observe that an
implication of the form:
1.0 1. P
2. Q
only says "IF P THEN Q." It does not say: "IF NOT P, THEN NOT Q." It
specifically leaves open the possibility that Q may result from some cause other
than P. In other words, an implication states merely that P is one cause of Q;
it does not assert that P is the only cause of Q. If the first pulverization of the
hypothetical paragraph is into just two constituent elements, it can be repre-
sented by the schematic, 1.0. It is then of the form:
IF knowledge will become valuable to a reader during the coming year, THEN
a specified consequent Q follows.
Second, notice that a statement like 1.0, involving only implication, might
be an abbreviation for an even more complex statement such as:
2.0 1. P
2. Q1
&3. Q2
This statement involves both implication and conjunction. The Q in 1.0 ab-
breviates the conjunction "Q1 & Q2" of 2.0. The schematic 2.0 can be inter-
preted as asserting: "IF P, THEN Q1 AND Q2." Notice that this is equivalent
to the pair of subsidiary propositions:
1. IF P, THEN Q1.
&2. IF P, THEN Q2.
In the hypothetical paragraph this further pulverization would explicitly point
out that consequent Q is made up of two simpler propositions:
Q1. that such a reader should be willing to give his careful attention to such knowl-
edge under certain conditions
&Q2. that the gain resulting therefrom will probably not be worth the time under cer-
tain other conditions.
Third, it is possible that the implication-conjunction statement of 2.0 might
be an abbreviation for an even more complex statement such as:
1. P
3.0 2. 1. QIP
2. Q1Q
&3. Q2
This statement involves coimplication, as well as implication and conjunction.
The Q1 of 2.0 abbreviates the coimplication of 3.0:
1. QIP
2. Q1Q
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What 3.0 asserts is: "IF P, THEN (QiP IF AND ONLY IF Q1Q) and Q2."
This is equivalent to the pair of propositions:
1. IF P, THEN QIP IF AND ONLY IF Q1Q.
&2. IF P, THEN Q2.
It is also equivalent to the three subsidiary propositions:
1. IF P, THEN IF Q1P, THEN Q1Q.
&2. IF P, THEN IF NOT QIP, THEN NOT Q1Q.
&3. IF P, THEN Q2.
In the hypothetical paragraph this further pulverization is a breakdown of Q1
into two constituents jointed by coimplication:
IF AND ONLY IF certain conditions are fulfilled, THEN such a readcr should
give his careful attention to such knowledge.
At this stage the schematic is still a relatively simple one. Complexity of
form has been added to the initial implication of 1.0 in single steps. In the next
four stages complexity will be added more rapidly to arrive at a more detailed
schematic representation of the logical form of the hypothetical paragraph. At
the fourth stage the implication-conjunction-coimplication statement of 3.0 can
be regarded as an abbreviation for a still more complex statement such as:
1. P
2. 1. 1) QIPI
4.0 2) &OR Q1P2
3) &OR Q1P3
2. Q1Q
&3. Q2
This more complete representation involves inclusive disjunction in addition to
the other logical connectives in 3.0. The QIP of 3.0 abbreviates the inclusive
disjunction "Q1P1 &OR QIP2 &OR QlP3 ' of 4.0. What 4.0 asserts is:
IF P, THEN (QIPI &OR Q1P2 &OR Q1P3 IF AND ONLY IF Q1Q) AND Q2.
This, in turn, is equivalent to a pair of propositions and three propositions the
same as those shown for 3.0, except that the inclusive disjunction "QIPI &OR
Q1P2 &OR QlP3" is substituted for Q1P. It is also equivalent to the five sub-
sidiary propositions:
1. IF P, THEN IF QIPI, THEN Q1Q.
&2. IF P, THEN IF Q1P2, THEN Q1Q.
&3. IF P, THEN IF Q1P3, THEN Q1Q.
&4. IF P, THEN IF NOT QIPI AND NOT QIP2 AND NOT Q1P3, THEN NOT
Q1Q.
&5. IF P, THEN Q2.
In the hypothetical paragraph this further pulverization is a breakdown of the
"certain conditions" of Q1P into three inclusive disjuncts:
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Q1Pi) that reader is a lawyer
Q1P2) &OR that knowledge is about drafting
QIP3) &OR a set of other conditions occurs
At the fifth stage 4.0 can be spelled out in greater detail by:
1. P
2. 1. 1) QIPI
2) &OR Q1P2
5.0 3) &OR 1. NOT Q1P1
&2. Q1P32
&3. QIP33
&4. Q1P34
2. Q1Q
&3. Q2
This statement adds negation and more conjunction to the logical connectives
of 4.0. The Q1P3 of 4.0 abbreviates the conjunction "NOT QIPI & QIP32
& QIP33 & Q1P34" of 5.0. The statement can be interpreted as expressing the
proposition: "IF P, THEN [QIP1 &OR Q1P2 &OR (NOT QIPI AND Q1P32
AND Q1P33 AND Q1P34) IF AND ONLY IF Q1Q] AND Q2." It can also
be interpreted as expressing a pair, three or five propositions similar to those
shown for 4.0. In addition, it can be interpreted as expressing the following sev-
en subsidiary propositions:
1. IF P, THEN IF QIPI, THEN QIQ.
&2. IF P, THEN IF Q1P2, THEN Q1Q.
&3. IF P, THEN IF NOT Q1P1 AND Q1P32 AND Q1P33 AND Q1P34, THEN
QIQ.
&4. IF P, THEN IF NOT QIPI AND NOT Q1P2 AND NOT Q1P32, THEN
NOT Q1Q.
&5. IF P, THEN IF NOT QIPI AND NOT Q1P2 AND NOT QlP33, THEN
NOT Q1Q.
&6. IF P, THEN IF NOT Q1P1 AND NOT Q1P2 AND NOT Q1P34, THEN
NOT Q1Q.
&7. IF P, THEN Q2.
In the hypothetical paragraph this further pulverization is the breakdown of
the "set of other conditions" of Q1P3 into four conjunctive constituents:
QIP31. that reader is NOT a lawyer
& Q1P32. skill of expression is achieved by that reader as a result of the information
he discovers &OR acquires &OR derives from an understanding of this
article's nonlegal information
& QIP33. the benefits of this article's nonlegal information could be used to improve
even the writing &OR drafting of this article
& QIP34. that nonlegal information of this article in its effect upon increasing skill
of expression was valuable (without regard to that particular reader's dis-
covery &OR acquisition &OR derivation) at the time that such skill of ex-
pression was achieved by that reader.
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At the sixth stage the Q2 of 5.0 is shown in more detail. It is an abbreviation
for the implication:
1. NOT QiP1
&2. NOT Q1P2
&3. NOT Q1P32 &OR NOT Q1P33 &OR NOT Q1P34
4. Q2Q
Thus, the more complex representation of 5.0 would be:
6.0 1. P
2. 1. 1) QIPI
2) &OR Q1P2
3) &OR 1. NOT Q1P1
&2. Q1P32
&3. QIP33
&4. QIP34
2. Q1Q
&3. 1. NOT Q1P1
&2. NOT QIP2
&3. NOT Q1P32 &OR NOT Q1P33 &OR NOT Q1P34
4. Q2Q
This can be interpreted as expressing the proposition:
IF P, THEN [QIP1 &OR Q1P2 &OR (NOT QIPI AND Q1P32 AND Q1P33
AND Q1P34) IF AND ONLY IF Q1Q] AND [IF NOT QLPI AND NOT Q1P2
AND (NOT Q1P32 &OR NOT Q1P33 &OR NOT Q1P34), THEN Q2Q].
It may also be interpreted as expressing two, three, five or seven propositions
similar to those indicated for 5.0. In addition, it may be interpreted as express-
ing the following nine subsidiary propositions:
1. IF P, THEN IF QIPI, THEN Q1Q.
&2. IF P, THEN IF Q1P2, THEN Q1Q.
&3. IF P, THEN IF NOT QIPI AND Q1P32 AND Q1P33 AND Q1P34, THEN
Q1Q.
&4. IF P, THEN IF NOT QIPI AND NOT Q1P2 AND NOT Q1P32, THEN
NOT Q1Q.
&5. IF P, THEN IF NOT QIPI AND NOT QIP2 AND NOT Q1P33, THEN
NOT Q1Q.
&6. IF P, THEN IF NOT Q1P1 AND NOT Q1P2 AND NOT QIP34, THEN
NOT Q1Q.
&7. IF P, THEN IF NOT QIPI AND NOT Q1P2 AND NOT Q1P32, THEN
Q2Q.
&S. IF P, THEN IF NOT QIPI AND NOT QIP2 AND NOT QIP33, THEN
Q2Q.
&9. IF P, THEN IF NOT QIPI AND NOT Q1P2 AND NOT QIP34, THEN
02Q.
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In the hypothetical paragraph this is the pulverization of Q2 into an implica-
tion consisting of three conjoined antecedents and a consequent:
Q2PI. the reader is NOT a lawyer
Q2P2. the knowledge is NOT about drafting
Q2P3. one of the conditions of subsection 2.1.3. is NOT satisfied
Q2Q. THE GAIN RESULTING THEREFROM WILL BE CONSIDERED
HERE TO BE A GAIN THAT REQUIRES SO LONG TO ACHIEVE
THAT IT IS PROBABLY NOT WORTH THE TIME.
Most of the hypothetical paragraph is represented by 6.0. There is one addi-
tion necessary for it to be a complete schematic representation, a definition of
Q1P2 such as the following:
6.01 1. 1) R1
2) &OR R2
2. S
where S is Q1P2 for purposes of 6.0. This proposition asserts: "(RI &OR R2)
IF AND ONLY IF S," which is equivalent to the three subsidiary propositions:
1. If RI, then S.
&2. If R2, then S.
&3. IF NOT RI AND NOT R2, THEN NOT S.
The coimplication expressed in 6.01 is the definition given in the hypothetical
paragraph of what constitutes "knowledge about drafting" for the purposes of
the hypothetical paragraph. Taken together 6.0 and 6.01 are a schematic repre-
sentation of both the hypothetical paragraph and the corresponding portions
of Section 166, from which the systematically-pulverized form of these state-
ments can be easily determined.
But first, it will be useful to gain some practice in interpreting a schematic
representation such as 6.0.
1. Suppose a situation in which the following conditions exist: QIPI, P and NOT
R1. What (if anything) can be concluded about QIQ from 6.0?
Referring back to the nine subsidiary propositions that 6.0 expresses, it is seen
that the first one states: "If P, then if Q1PI, then Q1Q." In this situation P
and QIP1 are given; therefore, on the basis of this first proposition it may be
concluded that Q1 Q is so. NOT RI is superfluous information.
2. Given P and NOT QIPI, what (if anything) can be concluded about Q1 Q from
6.0? About Q2Q?
The answers here are that there is NOT enough information given in this situa-
tion to permit any definite conclusions about Q1Q or Q2Q. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that along with P and NOT Q1PI, there is also given Q1P2. Then one
may conclude that Q1Q is so, but nothing about Q2Q. The conclusion about
Q1 Q would be based on the second of the nine subsidiary propositions of 6.0,
which states: "IF P, THEN IF Q1P2, THEN Q1Q." The seventh, eighth
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and ninth subsidiary propositions are the only ones of 6.0 that lead to some
conclusion about Q2Q. Since for none of these are all of the necessary condi-
tions fully satisfied by the facts given and assumed, no conclusion is possible
about Q2Q on the basis of 6.0 and the information given in this first hypo-
thetical. On the other hand, suppose in addition to being given P and NOT
QIPI, there is given NOT Q1P2 and NOT Q1P32. The seventh subsidiary
proposition of 6.0 states: "IF P, THEN IF NOT QIP1 AND NOT Q1P2
AND NOT Q1P32, THEN Q2Q." Thus, on the basis of 6.0 and the infor-
mation given in this second hypothetical, it may be concluded that Q2Q is so.
Furthermore, it may also be concluded that Q1 Q is NOT so from the fourth
subsidiary proposition of 6.0 which states: "IF P, THEN IF NOT Q1P1
AND NOT Q1P2 AND NOT Q1P32, THEN NOT Q1Q." These two hypo-
theticals show that, depending on what other conditions prevail along with the
given information, Q1Q may or may NOT be so, and one may or may NOT
be able to conclude that Q2Q is so.'
3. Given P, NOT Q1P1, NOT Q1P2 and NOT Q1P33, what (if anything) can
be concluded about Q1Q from 6.0? About Q2Q?
The fifth subsidiary proposition of 6.0 states: "IF P, THEN IF NOT Q1P1
AND NOT Q1P2 AND NOT Q1P33, THEN NOT QI Q." The eighth sub-
sidiary proposition of 6.0 states: "IF P, THEN IF NOT Q1P1 AND NOT
Q1P2 AND NOT Q1P33, THEN Q2Q."
Thus, from the facts given in this situation it may be concluded from 6.0 that
Q1Q is NOT so and Q2Q is so.
4. Given NOT P, NOT QIPI and NOT Q1P2, what (if anything) can be con-
cluded from 6.0 about Q1 Q? About Q2Q?
The answer here is that 6.0 does NOT apply; nothing can be concluded about
Q1Q or Q2Q on the basis of it. It is possible that Q1Q may or may NOT be
so, but whatever conclusion is reached about Q1 Q will be reached on the basis
of some statement other than 6.0. Similarly with Q2Q. In order to make 6.0
9 It should be noticed also that the antecedents of the fourth subsidiary proposition of 6.0
are the same as the antecedents of the seventh proposition; the antecedents for the fifth, the
same as those for the eighth; and those for the sixth, the same as those for the ninth. Since
NOT Q1 Q and Q2 Q arise only from these six propositions, whenever P is so; there is a rela-
tionship expressed in 6.0 between Q1Q and Q2Q such that whenever P is so, if NOT Q1Q,
then Q2Q.
In schematic form this would be:
1. P
2. 1. NOT Q1Q
2. Q2Q
This, in turn, is equivalent to:
1. P
&2. NOT Q1Q
3. Q2Q
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applicable it is necessary that P is so, and the information given in this situa-
tion states that P is NOT so.
5. Given NOT QiPI, P, NOT RI, NOT R2, Q1P32, Q1P33 and Q1P34, what
(if anything) can be concluded about Q IQ from 6.0? About Q2Q?
The third subsidiary proposition of 6.0 states: "IF P, THEN IF NOT QiPI
AND Q1P32 AND Q1P33 AND Q1P34, THEN QIP." Thus, it may be con-
cluded that Qi Q is so. The only subsidiary propositions of 6.0 that lead to any
conclusion about Q2Q are the seventh, eighth and ninth propositions. For one
of these to apply either Q1P32, Q1P33 or Q1P34 must NOT be so. However,
according to the information given in this situation, all three of these are so.
Therefore, 6.0 with the information given, does NOT lead to any conclusion
about Q2Q. With just a little practice an analyst can easily develop skill in
interpreting directly from the schematic to the situation being analyzed, with-
out going through the intermediate steps of explicitly deriving all of the sub-
sidiary propositions. Some statements will be so complex that they will con-
tain many more than just nine. For most purposes it will be both unduly labo-
rious and unnecessary to derive all of the subsidiary propositions. Therefore,
it is advisable for anyone using systematic-pulverization to develop at the out-
set skill in directly interpreting schematic representations. The five examples
given above have been included for that purpose.
From Table 3 and the schematics 6.0 and 6.01 the corresponding portions of
Section 166 and the hypothetical paragraph can be represented in systematical-
ly-pulverized form. It should be particularly noticed that the statements are
considerably simplified by the elimination of some unnecessary negations and
the "except" clause in the final sentence.10 These negations and the "except"
clause added superfluous complexity, and the same meaning is expressed in dif-
ferent form without them. The hypothetical paragraph in systematically-pul-
verized form is shown in Figure 1. The corresponding portions of Section 166 in
systematically-pulverized form would be similar.
A legitimate question to raise at this point is whether the systematically-pul-
verized form shown here is the only possible interpretation of the intended
meaning of the hypothetical paragraph. The answer to this question is: "defi-
nitely not." The interpretation given here is only one reasonable interpretation;
there are certainly other reasonable ones possible for both the hypothetical
paragraph and the corresponding portions of Section 166.11 For example, it
10 E.g., in systematically-pulverized form "knowledge about drafting" is defined rather than
"knowledge that is not about drafting." In the hypothetical paragraph it is stated that
when all other requisite conditions are satisfied and the knowledge is not about drafting,
the reader should not be willing to give his careful attention to such knowledge. In system-
atically-pulverized form it is stated that when all other requisite conditions are satisfied and
the reader should give his attention, the knowledge is about drafting.
" This same thing is true of the pulverizations to be stated later of Section 162, Section
165 and Section 166 in its entirety. They represent only one interpretation of what those
sections are intended to mean. These statements are, after all, highly ambiguous. It is to be
expected that they will lend themselves to more than just one reasonable interpretation.
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could be argued that in order to appropriately represent the intended meaning
of Section 166 and the hypothetical paragraph, the relationship between Q2Q
and its antecedents should be coimplication instead of merely implication as
shown.'2 If this were decided to be so, then many of the answers to the five situ-
ations given above would, of course, be modified. However, the important point
here is NOT whether implication or coimplication is more appropriate in this
instance, but that representation in systematically-pulverized form calls at-
1.0 1. Knowledge will become valuable to a reader during the coming year
2. 1. 1) that reader is a lawyer
2) &OR that knowledge is about drafting (see subsection 1.01)
3) &OR 1. that reader is NOT a lawyer
&2. skill of expression is achieved by that reader as
a result of the information he discovers &OR
acquires &OR derives from an understanding of
this article's nonlegal information
&3. the benefits of this article's nonlegal informa-
tion could be used to improve even the writing
&OR drafting of this article
&4. that nonlegal information of this article in its
effect upon increasing skill of expression was
valuable (without regard to that particular
reader's discovery &OR acquisition &OR deri-
vation) at the time that such skill of expression
was achieved by that reader
2. THAT READER SHOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE HIS
CAREFUL ATTENTION TO SUCH KNOWLEDGE
&3. 1. the reader is NOT a lawyer
&2. the knowledge is NOT about drafting (see subsection 1.01)
&3. one of the conditions of subsection 2.1.3 is NOT satisfied
4. THE GAIN RESULTING THEREFROM WILL BE CON-
SIDERED HERE TO BE A GAIN THAT REQUIRES SO
LONG TO ACHIEVE THAT IT IS PROBABLY NOT
WORTH THE TIME.
1.01 1. 1) knowledge is financially &OR professionally use-
ful in connection with a reader's writing &OR
drafting
2) &OR the gain from the value of knowledge is sustained
in the reader's writing &OR drafting
2. THAT KNOWLEDGE IS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT
DRAFTING FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION 1.0
FIG. 1.-The hypothetical paragraph
tention to such latent ambiguities. It ferrets them out. The draftsman or in-
terpreter is forced to ask himself: "Do I draw one line (implication) or two lines
(coimplication) under the antecedents of Q2Q?" Systematically-pulverizing
can also remind the advocate of the large number of alternative interpretations
for which arguments can usually be made from any given ambiguous statement.
12 By attempting to systematically pulverize these statements himself, the reader can
probably uncover other instances of reasonable alternative interpretations of the logical rela-
tionship prevailing between two constituent elements or combinations of elements.
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It indicates that in almost all statements in a natural language, ambiguity is
lurking. Systematic-pulverization helps spotlight that ambiguity.
From this systematically-pulverized representation of the hypothetical para-
graph it is a relatively easy matter to answer the five questions posed on pages
6-7. Transformed into propositions in schematic form, these questions and
the answers to them would appear:
1. Yes 1. P
&2. QiP1
&3. NOT RI
4. QIQ
2. No 1. P
&2. NOT QIPI
3. 1. NOT QIP2
&2. NOT QIP32 &OR NOT QIP33 &OR NOT QIP34
3. NOT Q1Q
3. No, Yes 1. P
&2. NOT QIPI
&3. NOT QIP2
&4. NOT Q1P33
5. NOT Q1Q
4. No, No, No 1. NOTP
&2. NOT QIPI
&3. NOT Q1P2
4. ------ (about Q1 Q)
&5. ------ (about Q2Q)
5. No, it cannot be concluded that it is probably NOT worth the time to read it. Yes
1. NOT R1 1. P
&2. NOT R2 &2. NOT QIPI
&3. NOT Q1P2
3. NOT S (i.e., NOT Q1P2) &4. Q1P32
&5. Q1P33
&6. Q1P34
7. -- --- (about Q2Q)
&8. Q1Q
SECTION 165
After this practice in interpreting and manipulating the logical concepts in-
volved in systematic-pulverization, it is now appropriate to turn attention to
expressing Sections 162, 165 and 166 in systematically-pulverized form. In the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the full text of Section 165 is:
Sec. 165 Losses
(a) General rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during
the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(b) Amount of deduction.-For purposes of subsection (a), the basis for determin-
ing the amount of the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis provided in
section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of property.
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(c) Limitation on losses of individuals.- In the case of an individual, the deduction
under subsection (a) shall be limited to-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not con-
nected with a trade or business; and
(3) losses of property not connected with a trade or business, if such losses
arise from fire, storm, shipwreck or other casualty, or from theft. No loss described in
this paragraph shall be allowed if, at the time of the filing of the return, such loss has
been claimed for estate tax purposes in the estate tax return.
(d) Wagering losses.-Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to
the extent of the gains from such transactions.
(e) Theft losses.-- For purposes of subsection (a), any loss arising from theft shall
be treated as sustained during the taxable year in which the taxpayer discovers such
loss.
(f) Capital losses.-Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed
only to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212.
(g) Worthless securities.-
(1) General rule.-If any security which is a capital asset becomes worthless
during the taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall, for the purposes of this sub-
title, be treated as a loss from the sale or exchange, on the last day of the taxable year,
of a capital asset.
(2) Security defined.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "security"
means-
(A) a share of stock in a corporation;
(B) a right to subscribe for, or to receive, a share of stock in a corpora-
tion; or
(C) a bond, debenture, note, or certificate, or other evidence of indebted-
ness, issued by a corporation or by a government or political subdivision thereof, with
interest coupons or in registered form.
(3) Securities in affiliated corporation.--For purposes of paragraph (1), any
security in a corporation affiliated with a taxpayer which is a domestic corporation
shall not be treated as a capital asset. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a corpo-
ration shall be treated as affiliated with the taxpayer only if-
(A) at least 95 percent of each class of its stock is owned directly by the tax-
payer, and
(B) more than 90 percent of the aggregate of its gross receipts for all tax-
able years has been from sources other than royalties, rents (except rents derived from
rental from properties to employees of the corporation in the ordinary course of its
operating business), dividends interest (except interest received on deferred purchase
price of operating assets sold), annuities, and gains from sales or exchanges of stocks
and securities.
In computing gross receipts for purposes of the preceding sentence, gross
receipts from sales or exchanges of stocks and securities shall be taken into account
only to the extent of gains therefrom.
(h) Cross references.-
(1) For special rule for banks with respect to worthless securities, see section
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(2) For disallowance of deduction for worthlessness of securities to which sub-
section (g) (2) (C) applies, if issued by a political party or similar organization, see
section 271.
One convenient pulverization of Section 165 is into the following 29 constituent
elements:
A = SUCH LOSSES SHALL BE ALLOWED AS A DEDUCTION
B = losses are
1. sustained during the taxable year
&2. NOT compensated for by insurance &OR otherwise
C = THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF ANY SUCH DE-
DUCTION SHALL BE THE ADJUSTED BASIS PROVIDED IN SEC-
TION 1011 FOR DETERMINING THE LOSS FROM THE SALE OR
OTHER DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY
D = those losses are sustained by an individual
E = those losses are incurred in trade &OR business
F = those losses are incurred in any transaction entered into for profit*
G = those losses are losses of property arising from fire &OR storm &OR shipwreck
&OR other casualty &OR theft*
H = at the time of the filing of the return, those losses have NOT been claimed for
estate tax purposes in the estate tax returnt
I = those losses are from wagering transactions
J = SUCH LOSSES SHALL BE ALLOWED ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF
GAINS FROM SUCH TRANSACTIONS
K = those losses arise from theft
L = SUCH LOSSES SHALL BE TREATED AS SUSTAINED DURING THE
TAXABLE YEAR IN WHICH THE TAXPAYER DISCOVERS THE
LOSSES
M = those losses are from sales &OR exchanges of capital assets
N = SUCH LOSSES SHALL BE ALLOWED ONLY TO THE EXTENT AL-
LOWED IN SECTIONS 1211 and 1212
0 = any security (see subsection 1.01) is a capital asset
P = any security becomes worthless during the taxable year
Q = ANY LOSSES RESULTING FROM SUCH A SECURITY BECOMING
WORTHLESS SHALL, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SUBTITLE, BE
TREATED AS A LOSS FROM THE SALE &OR EXCHANGE, ON THE
LAST DAY OF THE TAXABLE YEAR, OF A CAPITAL ASSET
R = SUCH A THING IS A SECURITY FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION
1.0-7
S = A thing is a share of stock in a corporation
T = A thing is a right to subscribe for &OR receive a share of stock in a c3rporation
U = A thing is a bond &OR debenture &OR note &OR certificate &OR other evi-
dence of indebtedness
1. issued by a corporation &OR government &OR political subdivision
thereof
&2. with interest coupons &OR in registered form
*Notice that the phrase "NOT connected with trade &OR business" is omitted. In sstematically-pulverized
form it is NOT needed for emphasis, and it is redundant to include it.
t Notice the change in wording and why it is appropriate when put in systematically-pulverized form.
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V = SUCH A CORPORATION SHALL BE TREATED AS NOT AFFILIATED
WITH THE TAXPAYER FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION 1.0-7.1.2
W = less than 95 percent of each class of the corporation's stock is owned directly by
the taxpayer 'I
X = more than 10 percent of the aggregate of the corporation's gross receipts for all
taxable gains has been from the following sources combined
1. royalties
&2. rents (NOT counting those derived from rental from properties to em-
ployees of the corporation in the ordinary course of its business)
&3. dividends
&4. interest (NOT counting that received on deferred purchase price of operat-
ing assets sold)
&5. annuities
&6. gains from the sale &OR exchange of stocks &OR securities (gross receipts
from these taken into account only to the extent of the gains therefrom)t
Y = those losses are sustained by other than an individuall
Z = the deductions for those losses are NOT limited in subsections 4 &OR 5 &OR 6
&OR 71
A2 = any security is NOT in a corporation affiliated (see subsection 1.02) with a
taxpayer which is a domestic corporations
B2 = any security is NOT a security issued by a political party &OR similar organi-
zationt
C2 = the taxpayer is NOT a bankJ
From Section 165 pulverized into these constituent elements a variety of
systematically-pulverized forms are possible. Discovery of the appropriate
schematic involves the analyst's judgment of what expectations the section
was intended to create. The interpretation suggested here turns out to be a
complex schematic, but this should be expected. After all, Section 165 is a com-
plex statement. The schematic form involves the following proposition and its
two supplementary propositions:
LO/ 1. B
&2. 1) Y
2) &OR 1. D
&2. 1) E
2) &OR F
3) &OR G
&3. H
3. . Z
2: A
&3. C
&4. 1. I
2. J
&5. 1. K
2. L
t Notice the -hange in wording and why it is appropriate when put in systematically-pulverized form.
Notice these additions, which are appropriate when Section 165 is put in systematically-pulverized form.
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&6. 1. M
2. N
&7. 1. 1. 0
&2. A2
&3. P
&4. B2
&2. C2
3. Q
1.01/ 1. 1) S
2) &OR T
3) &OR U
2. R
.02/ 1. 1) W
2) &OR X
2. V
The number of subsidiary propositions expressed in this set of propositions is
quite numerous. Nevertheless, it will be useful to spell them out in some detail.
Doing so will give the reader a check on this interpretation of Section 165 in
systematically-pulverized form. The subsidiary propositions expressed here can
be compared with the reader's intuitive judgment of what Section 165 says as
it is written in the Internal Revenue Code. The subsidiary propositions in ab-
breviated form, using the letters A, B, C, . . . , C2 to represent the constituent
elements, are as follows:
1. IF B AND Y, THEN IF Z, THEN A.
&2. IF B AND Y, THEN IF Z, THEN C.
&3. IF B AND Y, THEN IF I, THEN J.
&4. IF B AND Y, THEN IF K, THEN L.
&5. IF B AND Y, THEN IF M, THEN N.
&6. IF B AND Y, THEN IF 0 AND A2 AND P AND B2 AND C2, THEN Q.
&7. IF B AND Y, THEN IF NOT 0, THEN NOT Q.
&8. IF B AND Y, THEN IF NOT A2, THEN NOT Q.
&9. IF B AND Y, THEN IF NOT P, THEN NOT Q.
&10. IF B AND Y, THEN IF NOT B2, THEN NOT Q.
&11. IF B AND Y, THEN IF NOT C2, THEN NOT Q.
&12. IF B AND D AND E AND H, THEN IF Z, THEN A.
&13. IF B AND D AND E AND H, THEN IF Z, THEN C.
&14.
[Similar to 3-11 with (D AND E AND H) substituted for Y]
&22.
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&23. IF B AND D AND F AND H, THEN IF Z, THEN A.
&24. IF B AND D AND F AND H, THEN IF Z, THEN C.
&25.
* [Similar to 3-11 with (D AND F AND H) substituted for Y]
&33.
&34. IF B AND D AND G AND H, THEN IF Z, THEN A.
&35. IF B AND D AND G AND H, THEN IF Z, THEN C.
&36.
* [Similar to 3-11 with (D AND G AND H) substituted for Y]
&50.
1. I
&51. IF S, THEN R.
&52. IF T, THEN R.
&53. IF U, THEN R.
&54. IF NOT S AND NOT T AND NOT U, THEN NOT R.
1.02/
&55. IF W, THEN V.
&56. IF X, THEN V.
Section 165 in systematically-pulverized form is indicated by Figure 2.
L 1. Losses are
1. sustained during the taxable year
&2. NOT compensated for by insurance &OR otherwise
&2. 1) those losses are sustained by other than an individual
2) &OR 1. those losses are sustained by an individual
&2. those losses are
1) incurred in trade &OR business
2) &OR incurred in any transaction entered into for profit
3) &OR losses of property arising from fire &OR storm &OR
shipwreck &OR other casualty &OR theft
&3. at the time of the filing of the return, those losses have NOT been
claimed for estate tax purposes in the estate tax return
3. 1. the deductions for those losses are NOT limited in subsections 4 &OR 5 &OR 6
&OR 7
2. SUCH LOSSES SHALL BE ALLOWED AS A DEDUCTION
&3. THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF ANY SUCH DE-
DUCTION SHALL BE THE ADJUSTED BASIS PROVIDED IN SEC-
TION 1011 FOR DETERMINING THE LOSS FROM THE SALE OR
OTHER DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY
&4. 1. those losses are from wagering transactions
FIG. 2.-Section 165
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2. SUCH LOSSES SHALL BE ALLOWED ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF
GAINS FROM SUCH TRANSACTIONS
&5. 1. those losses arise from theft
2. SUCH LOSSES SHALL BE TREATED AS SUSTAINED DURING THE
TAXABLE YEAR IN WHICH THE TAXPAYER DISCOVERS THE
LOSSES
&6. 1. those losses arise from sales &OR exchanges of capital assets
2. SUCH LOSSES SHALL BE ALLOWED ONLY TO THE EXTENT AL-
LOWED IN SECTIONS 1211 AND 1212
&7. 1. any security (see subsection 1.01)
1. is a capital asset
&2. is NOT in a corporation affiliated (see subsection 1.02) with a taxpayer
which is a domestic corporation
&3. becomes worthless during the taxable year
&4. is NOT a security issued by a political party &OR similar organization
&2. the taxpayer is NOT a bank
3. ANY LOSSES RESULTING FROM SUCH A SECURITY BECOMING
WORTHLESS SHALL, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SUBTITLE, BE
TREATED AS A LOSS FROM THE SALE &OR EXCHANGE, ON THE
LAST DAY OF THE TAXABLE YEAR, OF A CAPITAL ASSET.
1.01/ 1. A thing is
1) a share of stock in a corporation
2) &OR a right to subscribe for &OR receive a share of stock inacorporation
3) &OR a bond &OR debenture &OR note &OR certificate &OR other evi-
dence of indebtedness
1. issued by a corporation &OR government &OR political sub-
division thereof
&2. with interest coupons &OR in registered form
2. SUCH A THING IS A SECURITY FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION
1.0-7
1.02/ 1. 1) Less than 95 percent of each class of the corporation's stock is
owned by the taxpayer
2) &OR more than 10 percent of the aggregate of the corporation's gross re-
ceipts for all taxable gains has been from the following sources com-
bined:
1. royalties
&2. rents (NOT counting those derived from rental from prop-
ertieb to employees of the corporation in the ordinary course
of business)
&3. dividends
&4. interest (NOT counting that received on deferred purchase
price of operating assets sold)
&5. annuities
&6. gains from the'sale &OR exchange of stocks &OR securities
(gross receipts from these taken into account only to the ex-
tent of the gains therefrom)
2. SUCH A CORPORATION SHALL BE TREATED AS NOT AFFILIATED
WITH THE TAXPAYER FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION 1.0-7.1.2
CROSS REFERENCES:
1. For special rule for banks with respect to worthless securities, see section 582.
2. For disallowance of deduction for worthlessness of securities to which subsection 1.01-
1.3 applies, if issued by a political party or similar organization, see section 271.
FiG. 2.-Section 165-Conlinixd
It is fairly easy to develop skill in reading all of the subsidiary propositions di-
rectly from this representation in systematically-pulverized form. A few ex-
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amples will be given here, and the reader can practice by expressing the other
subsidiary propositions in ordinary prose.
1. IF losses are sustained during the taxable year AND are NOT compensated for
by insurance &OR otherwise, AND those losses are sustained by other than an
individual;
THEN IF the deductions for those losses are NOT limited in subsections 4 &OR 5
&OR 6 &OR 7,
THEN such losses shall be allowed as a deduction.
8. IF losses are sustained during the taxable year AND are NOT compensated for
by insurance &OR otherwise, AND those losses are sustained by other than an
individual,
THEN IF a security is in a corporation affiliated (see subsection 1.02) with a
taxpayer which is a domestic corporation,
THEN any such losses resulting from such a security becoming worthless
shall, for purposes of this subtitle, NOT be treated as a loss from the sale
&OR exchange, on the last day of the taxable year, of a capital asset.
49. IF less than 95 percent of each class of the corporation's stock is owned directly
by the taxpayer,
THEN such a corporation shall be treated as NOT affiliated with the taxpayer
for purposes of subsection 1.0-7.1.2.
SECTION 166
The systematic-pulverization of this section of the tax code is done in a simi-
lar manner. Although it is shorter in length than the previous section, in some
respects Section 166 turns out to be more complex than Section 165. The sche-
matic representation of Section 166 will be constructed after indicating the
complete text of the section and how it is pulverized. The Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 states:
Sec. 166. Bad debts
(a) General rule.-
(1) Wholly worthless debts.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt
which becomes worthless within the taxable year.
(2) Partially worthless debts.- When satisfied that a debt is recoverable only in
part, the Secretary or his delegate may allow such debt, in an amount not in excess
of the part charged off within the taxable year, as a deduction.
(b) Amount of deduction.- For purposes of subsection (a), the basis for determin-
ing the amount of the deduction for any bad debt shall be the adjusted basis provided
in section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of property.
(c) Reserve for bad debts.-In lieu of any deduction under subsection (a), there
shall be allowed (in the discretion of the Secretary or his delegate) a deduction for a
reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts.
(d) Nonbusiness debts.-
(1) General rule.-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation-
(A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any non-business debt; and
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the taxable year,
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the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or exchange, dur-
ing the taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more than 6 months.
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined.-For purposes of paragraphs (1), the term "non-
business debt" means a debt other than-
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a
taxpayer's trade or business; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the tax-
payer's trade or business.
(e) Worthless securities.-This section shall not apply to a debt which is evi-
denced by a security as defined in section 165 (g) (2) (C).
(f) Guarantor of certain noncorporate obligations.-A payment by the taxpayer
(other than a corporation) in discharge of part or all of his obligation as a guarantor,
endorser, or indemnitor of a noncorporate obligation the proceeds of which were used
in the trade or business of the borrower shall be treated as a debt becoming worthless
within such taxable year for purposes of this section (except that subsection (d) shall
not apply), but only if the obligation of the borrower to the person to whom such
payment was made was worthless (without regard to such guaranty, endorsement, or
indemnity) at the time of such payment.
(g) Cross references.-
(1) For disallowance of deduction for worthlessness of debts owed by political
parties and similar organizations, see section 271.
(2) For special rule for banks with respect to worthless securities, see sec-
tion 582.
(3) For special rule for bad debt reserves of certain mutual savings banks, do-
mestic building and loan associations, and cooperative banks, see section 593.
A convenient pulverization of this is into the following 26 constituent ele-
ments:
A = THAT DEBT SHALL BE ALLOWED AS A DEDUCTION
B = the debt becomes wholly worthless within the taxable year
C = the debt becomes partially worthless within the taxable year (the Secretary
&OR his delegate are satisfied that the debt is recoverable only in part)
D = THERE SHALL BE ALLOWED A DEDUCTION FOR THAT DEBT, IN
AMOUNT NOT IN EXCESS OF THE PART CHARGED OFF WITHIN
THE TAXABLE YEAR
E = THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF ANY SUCH DE-
DUCTION FOR ANY SUCH BAD DEBT SHALL BE THE ADJUSTED
BASIS PROVIDED IN SECTION 1011 FOR DETERMINING THE LOSS
FROM THE SALE OR OTHER DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY
F = the Secretary &OR his delegate approve
G = THERE SHALL BE ALLOWED A DEDUCTION FOR A REASONABLE
ADDITION TO A RESERVE FUND FOR BAD DEBTS
H = the taxpayer is a corporation
I = the debt is a business debt [see subsection 1.0(1&2)1]
J = the debt becomes worthless within the taxable year
K - THE LOSS RESULTING THEREFROM SHALL BE CONSIDERED A
LOSS FROM THE SALE &OR EXCHANGE, DURING THE TAXABLE
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YEAR, OF A CAPITAL ASSET HELD FOR NOT MORE THAN SIX
MONTHS
L = THAT DEBT IS A BUSINESS DEBT FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTIONS
1.01 AND 1.02
M = A debt is created &OR acquired in connection with a taxpayer's trade &OR
business
N = the loss from the worthlessness of a debt is incurred in the taxpayer's trade
&OR business
0 = SUBSECTIONS 1.01 AND 1.02 SHALL APPLY
P = a debt is NOT evidenced by a security as defined in section 165-1.01
Q = a payment by that taxpayer is made in discharge of part OR all of his obliga-
tion as a guarantor &OR endorser &OR indemnitor of a noncorporate obligation
R = the proceeds of that noncorporate obligation were used in the trade &OR busi-
ness of the borrower
S = that noncorporate obligation (of the borrower to the person to whom the pay-
ment was made) was worthless (without regards to such guaranty &OR endorse-
ment &OR indemnity) at the time of that payment
T = the debtor is NOT a political party &OR similar organization
U = the taxpayer is NOT a bank
V = the taxpayer is NOT a
1) mutual savings bank
2) &OR domestic building & loan association
3) &OR cooperative bank
W = subsection 1.0 makes this section applicable
X = SUBSECTION 1.011 SHALL APPLY
Y = subsection 1.01 makes this subsection applicable
Z = one of the conditions of subsection 1.01-2.3 is NOT satisfied
A variety of ways of logically relating these constituent elements will probably
all represent reasonable interpretations of Section 166. The interpretation sug-
gested here is made up of five propositions-one main and four supplementary
propositions-that can be represented as follows:
1.0/ 1. T
&2. U
3. 1. P
2. 0
1.01/ 1. W
&2. 1) H
2) &OR I
3) &OR 1. NOT H
&2. Q
&3. R
&4. S
3. x
[Vol. 25
1957] SYSTEMATIC DRAFTING AND INTERPRETING 29
1.011/ 1. Y
2. 1. B
2. 1) A
2) &OR 1. F
2. G
&3. 1. C
&2. F
3. 1- D
OR
2- G
&4. 1. V
2. E
.02/ 1. W
&2. J
&3. NOT H
&4. NOT I
&5. Z
6. K
1.0(1&2)1 1. 1) M
2) & OR N
2. L
In systematically-pulverized form Section 166 would be written as shown in
Figure 3.
1.0/ 1. The debtor is NOT a political party &OR similar organization
2. the taxpayer is NOT a bank
3. 1. a debt is NOT evidenced by a security as defined in section 165-1.01
2. SUBSECTIONS 1.01 and 1.02 SHALL APPLY
1.01/ 1. subsection 1.0 makes this subsection applicable
&2. 1) the taxpayer is a corporation
2) &OR the debt is a business debt [see subsection 1.0(1&2)11
3) &OR 1. the taxpayer is NOT a corporation
&2. a payment by that taxpayer is made in discharge of part OR all
of his obligation as a guarantor &OR endorser &OR indemnitor
of a noncorporate obligation
&3. the proceeds of that noncorporate obligation were used in the
trade &OR business of the borrower
&4. that noncorporate obligation (of the borrower to the person to
whom the payment was made) was worthless (without regards
to such guaranty &OR endorsement &OR indemnity) at the
time of that payment
3. SUBSECTION 1.011 SHALL APPLY
1.011/ 1. subsection 1.01 makes this subsection applicable
2. 1. the debt becomes wholly worthless within the taxable year
2. 1) THAT DEBT SHALL BE ALLOWED AS A DE-
DUCTION
FIo. 3.-Section 166
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2) &OR 1. the Secretary &OR his delegate shall approve
2. THERE SHALL BE ALLOWED A DEDUC-
'ION FOR A REASONABLE ADDITION
TO A RESERVE FUND FOR BAD DEBTS
&3. 1. the debt becomes partially worthless within the taxable
year (the Secretary &OR his delegate are satisfied that the
debt is recoverable only in part)
&2. the Secretary &OR his delegate approve
3. 1- THERE SHALL BE ALLOWED A DEDUCTION
FOR THAT DEBT, IN A-MIOUNT NOT IN EX-
CESS OF THE PART CHARGED OFF WITHIN
THE TAXABLE YEAR
OR
2- THERE SHALL BE ALLOWED A DEDUCTION
FOR A REASONABLE ADDITION TO A RE-
SERVE FUND FOR BAD DEBTS
&4. 1. the taxpayer is NOT a
1) mutual savings bank
2) &OR domestic building & loan association
3) &OR cooperative bank
2. THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE AMOUNT
OF ANY SUCH DEDUCTION FOR ANY SUCH BAD
DEBT SHALL BE THE ADJUSTED BASIS PRO-
VIDED IN SECTION 1011 FOR DETERMINING THE
LOSS FROM THE SALE OR OTHER DISPOSITION
OF PROPERTY
1.02 1. subsection 1.0 makes this subsection applicable
&2. the debt becomes worthless within the taxable year
&3. the taxpayer is NOT a corporation
&4. that debt is NOT a business debt [see subsection 1.0(1&2)1]
&5. one of the conditions ot subsection 1.01-2.3 is NOT satisfied
6. THE LOSS RESULTING THEREFROM SHALL BE CONSIDERED
A LOSS FROM THE SALE &OR EXCHANGE, DURING THE TAX-
ABLE YEAR, OF A CAPITAL ASSET HELD FOR NOT MORE THAN
SIX MONTHS
1.0(1&2)1/ 1. 1) A debt is created &OR acquired in connection with a
taxpayer's trade &OR business
2) &OR the loss from the worthlessness of a debt is incurred
in the taxpayer's trade &OR business
2. THAT DEBT IS A BUSINESS DEBT FOR PURPOSES OF
SUBSECTIONS 1.01 AND 1.02
CROSS REFERENCES:
1. For disallowance of deduction for worthlessness of debts owed by political parties
&OR similar organization, see section 271.
2. For special rule for banks with respect to worthless securities, see section 582.
3. For special rule for bad debt reserves of certain mutual savings banks &OR domestic
building & loan associations &OR cooperative banks, see section 593.
FIG. 3.-Section 166-Continued
SECTION 162
The full text of the expense section of the tax code states:
Sec. 162. Trade or business expense
(a) In general.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
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sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including-
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal serv-
ices actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and
lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the con-
tinued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to which
the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the place of residence of a Member of Con-
gress (including any Delegate and Resident Commissioner) within the State, congres-
sional district, Territory or possession which he represents in Congress shall be con-
sidered his home, but amounts expended by such Members within each taxable year
for living expenses shall not be deductible for income tax purposes in excess of $3,000.
(b) Charitable contributions and gifts excepted.-No deduction shall be allowed
under subsection (a) for any contribution or gift which would be allowable as a deduc-
tion under Section 170 were it not for the percentage limitations, or the requirements
as to the time of payment, set forth in such section. 1
3
13 Section 162 illustrates rather vividly how in a natural language the little words "and"
and "or" are used to indicate a wide variety of logical relationships. Just which logical relation-
ship the use of one of these words is intended to indicate in a particular statement may or
may not be clear from an examination of the statement in context. The degree of clarity will
vary from context to context. Frequently these words connect classes, rather than proposi-
tions, but such usage can readily be transformed into logical relationships between propo-
sitions. Our impression of what logical relationships between propositions the words "and"
and "or" were intended to indicate as used in Section 162 is as follows:
The word "or" used to indicate iclusihe disjunction (A or B or both)
"paid or incurred"
(paid or incurred or both)
"trade or business"
(trade or business or both)
"salaries or other compensation"
(salaries or other compensation or both)
"rentals or other payments"
(rentals or other payments or both)
"use or possession"
(use or possession or both)
"percentage limitations or the requirements"
(percentage limitations or the requirements or both)
The word "and" used to indicate inclusive dNsjunction
"meals and lodging"
(meals or lodging or both)
"traveling expenses ... and rentals"
(traveling expenses ... or rentals or both)
The word "or" used to indicate exclusive disjunction (A or B, but NOT both)
"Territory or possession"
(Territory or possession, but NOT both)
[Footnote 13 continued on following page]
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(c) Cross reference.-
For special rule relating to expenses in connection with subdividing real prop-
erty for sale, see section 1237.
A convenient pulverization of section 162 is into the following twelve con-
stituent elements:
A = An ordinary & necessary expense (see subsection 1.01) is paid &OR incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade &OR business
B = the expense is NOT an item for which deduction is disallowed by subsection 1.02
C = THERE SHALL BE ALLOWED A DEDUCTION FOR SUCH AN EX-
PENSE
D = an item is a reasonable allowance for
1) salaries
2) &OR other compensation
for personal services actually rendered 14
The word "and" used to indicate exchasive disjunction
"Delegate and Resident Commissioner"
(Delegate or Resident Commissioner, but NOT both)
The word "or" used to indicate conjunction (A and B)
"has not taken or is not taking"
(has not taken and is not taking)
".... title or in which he has no equity"
(... title and in which he has no equity)
The word "and" used to indicate conjunction
"ordinary and necessary expenses"
(ordinary and necessary expenses)
The word "or" used ambiguously to indicate coimnplication or exclusive disjunction
"contribution or gift"
(contribution, that is to say, gift)
or
(contribution or gift or both)
The word "and" used ambiguously to indicate coimplication or exclusive disjunction
"contributions and gifts"
(contributions, that is to say, gifts)
or
(contributions or gifts or both)
The symbolic logician would prefer to use a separate symbol to indicate each of these relation-
ships, each symbol having only one logical meaning. Then he would not have to pause, reflect
and figure out from the context in which the symbol is used just what logical relationship it
was intended to indicate. In this manner he expedites thought and makes it more precise.
Systematic-pulverization achieves these same objectives in a manner that avoids notation
likely to be unfamiliar to lawyers.
14 This clause illustrates a common type of ambiguity that a draftsman could easily avoid
by using systematic-pulverization. This is an ambiguity of reference. When a statement con-
tains this ambiguity, the logicians call the statement amphibolous. In Section 162 the ambigui-
ty of reference involves the phrase "for personal services actually rendered." Which is the
phrase intended to refer to:
1- both "salaries" and "other compensation"
OR
2- only "other compensation"?
The first alternative would allow a reasonable deduction for salaries as ordinary and necessary
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E = an item is a travel expense (including the entire amount expended for meals
&OR lodging)
1. while away from home (see subsection 1.011)
&2. in the pursuit of trade &OR business
F = an item is rentals &OR other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use &OR possession, for purposes of trade &OR business, of property
1. to which the taxpayer
1. has NOT taken
&2. is NOT taking
title
&2. in which he has NO equity
G = SUCH AN ITEM IS AN ORDINARY & NECESSARY EXPENSE OF
CARRYING ON A TRADE &OR BUSINESS
H = a person is a Member of Congress (including any Delegate OR Resident Com-
missioner)
I = FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION 1.01 THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE
OF SUCH A PERSON WITHIN THE STATE OR CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICT OR TERRITORY OR POSSESSION WHICH HE REPRE-
SENTS IN CONGRESS SHALL BE CONSIDERED HIS HOME
J = AMOUNTS EXPENDED BY SUCH PERSONS WITHIN EACH TAX-
ABLE YEAR FOR LIVING EXPENSES SHALL NOT BE DEDUCTIBLE
FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES IN EXCESS OF $3,000
K = an item is a contribution &OR gift that is NOT allowed as a deduction under
Section 170 because of the
1) percentage limitations
2) &OR requirements as to the time of payment
set forth in such Section
L = NO DEDUCTION SHALL BE ALLOWED UNDER SUBSECTION 1.0
FOR SUCH AN ITEM
expenses only when those salaries were "for personal services actually rendered." On the other
hand, the second alternative would allow a reasonable deduction for salaries as ordinary and
necessary expenses whether or not those salaries were "for personal services actually rendered."
In systematically-pulverized form, just which alternative was intended could be made abso-
lutely clear. The first alternative would be expressed:
1. a reasonable allowance for
1) salaries
2) &OR other compensation
for personal services actually rendered
The second alternative would be expressed:
2. a reasonable allowance for
1) salaries
2) &OR other compensation for personal services actually rendered
And, in the unlikely event that the draftsman wished to leave this ambiguous, he would even
be able to do that in systematically-pulverized form. To indicate an intentional ambiguity it
would be written:
3. a reasonable allowance for salaries &OR other compensation for personal services
actually rendered.
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The interpretation suggested here of the logical structure of Section 162 is
indicated in the following schematic:
1.0/ 1. A (see 1.01)
&2. B (see 1.02)
3. C
.01/ 1 ..............
1) D
2) &OR E (see 1.011)
3) &OR F
2. G
1.0 1.
2. I
&3. J
1.02/ 1. K
2. L
In systematically-pulverized form Section 162 would be written as shown
in Figure 4.
In concluding this systematic-pulverization of Sections 162, 165 and 166 it is
worth mentioning that such a system of drafting may have implications of con-
siderable significance. One of the important advantages of drafting a statute in
systematically-pulverized form is that the logical relationships between its
constituent elements are clearly expressed and easily understood. This means
that once the facts of a case have been characterized in terms of the constituent
elements of a given statutory section, it requires a minimum of mental effort to
figure out what effect that section has upon those facts. In fact, this aspect of the
reasoning involved in applying a statute to a set of facts is so routine that it can
be done entirely by a computing machine.15 This would free the mind of the law-
yer to concentrate on those aspects of the problem that actually require human
thinking. The most important aspect of decision making, and the one that actu-
ally requires human judgment and thinking, is the characterization of the facts
in terms of the constituent elements of a statute or a common law rule. How-
ever, when complex statutes are drafted in the customary form, a great deal
of the lawyer's mental energy must be devoted to figuring out the logical rela-
tionships prevailing between the various constituent elements of the statute.
And this is an unnecessary sidetracking of his focus of attention from the im-
portant aspect of the problem. Also, when a statement is drafted in the usual
way, the probability of inadvertently incorporating ambiguity into it is greater
15 The logical relationships dealt with in systematic-pulverization are components of what
the symbolic logicians call "propositional calculus." For a simple method of expressing propo-
sitional calculus so that it can be handled by a digital computer, see Ledley, Mathematical
Foundations and Computational Methods for a Digital Logic Machine, 2 J. Operations Re-
search Society of America 249 (1954). See also, unpublished paper of Richard Helgeson at Yale
Law School, A Preliminary Design for Coding Statutes to Punched Cards (1951).
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than when that statement is drafted in systematically-pulverized form. Thus,
the amount of attention wasted may be even further increased. Systematic-
pulverization can go a long way in helping to simplify complex statutes like the
Internal Revenue Code. And is there any toiler in the vineyard of the tax code
who would not welcome such simplification?
1.0/ 1. An ordinary & necessary expense (see subsection 1.01) is paid &OR incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade &OR business
&2. the expense is NOT an item for which deduction is disallowed by subsection 1.02
3. THERE SHALL BE ALLOWED A DEDUCTION FOR SUCH AN EXPENSE
1.01 1. an item is
1) a reasonable allowance for
1) salaries
2) &OR other compensation
for personal services actually rendered
2, &OR a travel expense (including the entire amount expended for meals
&OR lodging)
1. while away from home (see subsection 1.011)
&2. in the pursuit of trade &OR business
3, &OR rentals &OR other payments required to he made as a condition
to the continued use &OR possession, for purposes of trade &OR
business, of property
1. to which the taxpayer
1. has NOT taken
&2. is NOT taking
title
&2. in which he has NO equity
2. SUCH AN ITEM IS AN ORDINARY & NECESSARY EXPENSE OF
CARRYING ON A TRADE &OR BUSINESS
1.011 / 1. a person is a Mfember of Congress (including any Delegate OR Resi-
dent Commissioner)
2. FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION 1.01 THE PLACE OF RESI-
DENCE OF SUCH A PERSON WITHIN THE STATE OR CON-
GRESSIONAL DISTRICT OR TERRITORY OR POSSESSION
WHICH HE REPRESENTS IN CONGRESS SHALL BE CON-
SIDERED HIS HOME
&3. AMOUNT EXPENDED BY SUCH PERSONS WITHIN EACH
TAXABLE YEAR FOR LIVING EXPENSES SHALL NOT BE
DEDUCTIBLE FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES IN EXCESS
OF 53,000
1.2y 1. an item is a contribution &OR gift that is NOT allowed as a deduction under
Section 170 because of the
1) percentage limitations
2) &OR requirements as to the time of payment
set forth in such Section
2. NO DEDUCTION SHALL BE ALLOWED UNDER SUBSECTION 1.0
FOR SUCH AN ITEM
CROSS REFERENCE:
1. For special rule relating to expenses in connection with subdividing real property for
sale, see Section 1237.
FIG. 4.-Section 162
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II. TOWARD A MORE ScmNTrnc THEORY OF INTERPRETATION
Turning now to the difficult problem of assigning the appropriate meaning
to a word or phrase, often it will be apparent from the statement itself just
which logical connection is intended by the words in the statement. However,
when a doubtful situation is encountered some criteria are needed for deciding
between the various possible alternative interpretations. Making such decisions
is a prerequisite to transforming statements into systematically-pulverized
form. The development of criteria for making such decisions will also have a
useful by-product. Criteria for deciding what syntactical relationship is intended
by the "logical" words in a statement will also be useful in the more difficult
problem of assigning the appropriate meaning to "descriptive" words or phrases.
The solution of the semantic problem with descriptive words is a more artful
and less certain process than discovering the appropriate logical relationships.
There is more flexibility in interpreting descriptive words-more room for dis-
pute. However, it is suggested that even this process can be polished up and
made more predictable if an appropriate theoretical framework is developed.
That is what is attempted in this section.
A theory of interpretation that embodies two of the important characteristics
of scientific method is suggested."6 These characteristics are:
1. the systematic character of the procedure
&2. the tentativeness of any conclusions reached."
Underlying this suggested theory and emphasizing its systematic and tentative
characteristics, is a set of presuppositions that it is, perhaps, useful to set forth
explicitly."8 These are:
1. that interpretation is always necessary (it is begging the question to assert that it
is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation);
2. that the task of an interpreter is to ascertain the common expectations that parties
created in each other, and when such expectations are shadowy, to apply established
community policies to resolve controversy (the prior and subsequent conduct of
all participants offers relevant indicia of common expectations);
3. that the function of criteria (canons) of interpretation is to point to factors in the
total context which indicate common expectations and community policies (such
principles of interpretation do not justify the decision reached; they are merely
convenient reminders of the significant factors that should be taken into account
in reaching a decision);
4. that the alleged "ordinary and natural meaning" of words are at best only pre-
sumptive indications of how words may have been used in a particular context;
5. that words should always be interpreted in the total context in which they are used;
6. that an adequate theory of interpretation includes both criteria of interpretation
16 The usefulness of this theory of interpretation is illustrated in Part III below with re-
spect to the phrase "trade or business" as it appears in several sections of the tax code.
"7 For discussion of the tentative nature of scientific theories and the systematic character
of scientific method, see Copi, Introduction to Logic 385-411 (1953).
Is Discussion of these is included in a forthcoming article by Professor Myres McDougal.
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by broad underlying policy and major purpose as well as criteria of restrictive in-
terpretation.
The approach to interpretation suggested here is similar to a description of
scientific method by Professor Henry Margenau, which has been represented
graphically by Nicholas Smith.1" Figure 5 is a slightly modified version of this.
In this representation 01, 02 etc. are observations; P1, P2 etc. are postulated con-
structs. The arrows represent inconsistencies uncovered by new observations,
which require revisions of the scientific postulates. P5 represents a construct of
higher abstraction. According to this view of scientific method, a series of obser-
vations is first made as indicated by 01 through 04. On the basis of these observa-
tions certain postulates P and P2 are made concerning the nature of the physical
01
02 P,, P202
04
01 P+ 1, P2', P3
06
6)07 P1, P2 ,~ P3, P408 -----.I
E-~ 0, 5,P
010
FIG. 5.-Scientific method
world. This set of postulates, together with the rules for interactions between
them, constitute the scientific theory. This theory will be part of the perceptual
framework within which future observations will be made. Sooner or later a
new observation, indicated by 05, is made that gives results inconsistent with
the preceding postulates. Because of this, it may be necessary, not only to re-
adjust some of the previous postulates (P2 to P2'), but also to add new ones
(P3) in order to restore consistency in an ever-widening area of observation.
This produces the revised set of postulates P1, P2' and P 3. Figure 5 indicates
that 06, 07, 08 and 09 can be predicted by the revised theory, because they are
consistent with it. However, sooner or later a new observation, as indicated by
O0o, again uncovers an inconsistency, which requires another revision of the
theory to restore consistency. Occasionally the theory itself gets so cumbersome
in the number of postulates and the complexity of the relations between them
that more general postulates are sought that reduce the number of postulates
in the theory, and thus, simplify it (replacement of P1, P2' and P3' by P5 in
Figure 5).
11 Smith, A Calculus for Ethics: A Theory of the Structure of Value, 2 Behavioral Science
140 (April, 1956). The explanation of Figure 5 given here closely parallels Smith's discus-
sion of it.
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Such a description of scientific method clearly reveals the characteristics
that make science so extremely undogmatic. Not only are all conclusions tenta-
tively held, ready to be modified in light of contradictory evidence in a broader
context, but systematic efforts are continuously made to broaden the context
within which conclusions are drawn. It is suggested that a similar explicit ap-
proach would be appropriate for interpreting the meaning of words in legal con-
texts. Figure 6 represents this suggested procedure. In this representation 01, 02
etc. again are observations; the entire set Ml, i 2, . . . ML is the total meaning
attributed to the word or phrase in question, each 'A. representing one com-
ponent of that total meaning. The arrow represents a reasonably clear indication
that there should be a shift in meaning. Interpretation of a word or phrase by
this method would proceed in a systematic, step-by-step procedure as follows:
Step 1
The word or phrase would first be examined alone (Or), then in the context
of the clause (02), and finally, in the context of the entire sentence (03) in
I0'
02 Al,, M2
04-------+ Ml', N12, M3
0, VAL'", M2., M13', A14
S0,
,. J
FIG. 6.-A method of interpretation
which it appears before any assignment of meaning is made. This is the appro-
priate stage to consult a dictionary for suggestions of various meanings of the
words. A presumption is raised here that the word or phrase means what seems
most appropriate in the context of that sentence (in Figure 6, shown as M,
and M2). This, however, should be regarded as a tentative conclusion about the
meaning to be assigned to the word or phrase in question. It may be rebutted
in light of further evidence.
Step 2
Next, examine the entire paragraph in which the questionable phrase ap-
pears (04). The decision-maker interpreting the instrument should make an ex-
plicit judgment about whether the context of the whole paragraph shows any
reasonably clear indication that the initial meaning assigned to the phrase in
STEP 1 should be modified. If there is such indication, then a different, but
still tentative, meaning should be assigned to replace the meaning initially as-
signed-the meaning assigned in STEP 2 being that which seems most ap-
propriate in the wider context of the whole paragraph. If there is no such rea-
sonably clear indication, then the meaning assigned in STEP 1 should be re-
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tained as the STEP 2 meaning. Figure 6 indicates that 04 turns up some rea-
sonably clear indication that M and M2 should be modified to become M,
L12 and M 3. Notice that in both of the first two steps as in all of the succeeding
steps, the decision-maker is required to make an explicit judgment about the
meaning of the phrase in question. At each stage as the context is widened, he
is required to judge whether the tentative meaning assigned to the question-
able phrase when looked at it in a narrower context should be modified when
viewed in a broader context. It might be worthwhile, for purposes of guiding
others in the future, to encourage decision-makers to make these explicit judg-
ments available in their written opinions.
Step 3
Move next to a still wider chunk of context. What is the next appropriate
chunk of context will vary depending on the instrument being interpreted. For
example, in interpreting a statute the appropriate sequence of expanding con-
texts might be:
1. A
2. A & B
3. A & B & C
4. A&B&C&D
5. A&B &C&D&E
6. A&B &C&D &E&F
7. A&B &C&D &E&F&G
where A = subsection
B = other relevant subsections of the entire section
C = other relevant sections of the entire subtitle
D = other relevant subtitles of the entire title
E = other relevant titles of the entire statute
F = other relevant statutes
G = the relevant parts of the constitution
Whatever is the next appropriate chunk of context, the decision-maker should
make an explicit judgment whether in light of this wider context there is any
reasonably clear indication that the meaning assigned in STEP 2 should be
modified. If there is such indication, the STEP 2 meaning should be appropriate-
ly modified to become the STEP 3 meaning; if NOT, then the STEP 2 meaning
should be retained. In Figure 6 the meaning assigned on the basis of 01, 02, 03
and 04 is retained for 05.
Step 4
Move next to an even wider context-to the total situation in which the in-
strument being interpreted was created. This refers to the entire context im-
mediately preceding (the relevant wording of the relevant instruments) plus
something more--for example, something more like the legislative history of a
statute or the circumstances involved in the making of a contract, including the
customary meaning which the words in question have been given in such con-
19571
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
texts. Again at this stage, repeat the process of making an explicit judgment
and modifying the assigned meaning if it seems appropriate to do so. Figure 6
indicates that 06 discloses a reasonably clear indication that the STEP 3 mean-
ing (MI', M 2, M 3) should be modified to become M1T', M 2 , 1\I3, M 4.
Step 5
Finally, in deciding what meaning should be given to a questionable phrase,
the decision-maker should look to the total context in which the decision is be-
ing made. This refers to the context immediately preceding (the total situation
in which the instrument being interpreted is created) plus something more, the
something more being the public policy that the decision-maker is seeking to
implement in making such a decision. This widest context of all should be ex-
amined in the same way that preceding narrower contexts were, to see if there
is any reasonably clear indication that the tentative meaning assigned pre-
viously should be modified; and modifying it appropriately if there is such
indication.
In one respect this suggested method of interpretation is different from scien-
tific method. The expectation in scientific investigation is that eventually an
observation will be made that will require modification of the set of postulated
constructs, whereas in the suggested method of interpretation it is probable
that in many instances the meaning appropriate after examining the broadest
context will be the same meaning as the one initially assigned in the narrowest
context.
If interpretation were handled in the manner suggested here, then in a situa-
tion where one context indicates that a different meaning should be assigned to
a word or phrase from the meaning assigned from the perspective of another
context, it would be the broader2 of the two contexts that would control. Thus,
such a procedure would provide criteria for resolving disputes arising over the
meaning of words or phrases. Attention would be focused upon whether there
is any reasonably clear indication in the broader context that the meaning ten-
tatively assigned in the narrower context should be modified, rather than upon
arguments about whether the meaning of words or the underlying policy should
control. Whether or not there is such a reasonably dear indication would de-
pend upon how clearly the meaning is indicated in the constituent parts of each
context and how much broader the one context is than the other. Thus, a judg-
ment on how much weight to put on literal wording versus policy considerations
would still be necessary, but it would no longer be the only evaluation re-
quired. The appropriate meaning in all the subcontexts in the total context
20 The notion of breadth (or width) is being used in the following sense:
IF context A includes context B AND context A includes something more, THEN
context A is broader than context B.
Although for some purposes this would only be a partial definition, it is adequate here because
all of the contexts that it may be necessary to decide between are such that one is included
in the other.
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would be considered, evaluated and would influence the ultimate determination
of what the word or phrase in question should be held to mean. Hence, although
the suggested method of interpretation merely makes systematic and explicit
what decision-makers already do to a great extent on an intuitive basis, it can
nevertheless help focus attention on all the factors that should be considered and
help provide a means of reconciling the policy-oriented approach to interpre-
tation with the strict construction approach. Since it is the total context that
ultimately controls, the meaning of a word or phrase will be determined by
(1) public policy in conjunction with (2) the total situation in which the instru-
ment being interpreted was created (which includes the relevant wording of all
the relevant instruments). Thus, although the context, where public policy is
considered will ultimately control, the meanings of words determined in nar-
rower contexts will not be without powerful influence. Policy goals that are ex-
tremely hazy, for example, would not be sufficient to modify clear statements of
meaning established in narrower contexts, nor would a court have free rein to
override a clear legislative mandate.2' What is required is a reasonably clear
indication that another meaning is appropriate. And of course, what constitutes
a "reasonably clear indication" is for the decision-maker to decide. This would
guarantee desirable flexibility for such a system of interpretation, while at the
same time an accumulating body of cases specifying what is and what is not
considered to be a "reasonably clear indication" would enhance predictability
for those interested.
In operating by means of such a system of interpretation it might well turn
out that it is appropriate to treat the same phrase as having a different mean-
ing in one section of a statute from what it has in another section; and further,
that a phrase that seems clearly to mean one thing when viewed in isolation
turns out to mean something quite different when viewed in a wider context.
This, of course, is true of other approaches to interpretation also. The only vir-
tue claimed for the approach suggested here is that it is systematic and made
explicit; and to the extent that this helps to make the decision-maker aware of
just where he is exercising judgment, it is more likely to disclose a situation
where it is reasonable to give two instances of the same term two different mean-
ings. It should be clear that the suggested approach to interpretation does not
replace human judgment. It only systematizes it. But the significance of system-
atizing judgment should not be underrated. It seems likely to us that appro-
priate interpretation by such technique can both help to minimize litigation
and help to avoid the necessity of clarifying legislation. A good example of
what can happen when interpretation is not done contextually is furnished by
the meaning that has been given by the courts to the phrase "trade or busi-
ness" in several sections of the tax code.
21 There are, however, situations where clear legislative mandates conflict with clear state-
ments of public policy embodied in the constitution. In such instances the courts are certainly
empowered to thwart a clear legislative intent-and should do so!
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III. "TRADE OR BUSINESS" IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
The phrase "trade or business" is used in more than sixty sections of the
Internal Revenue Code. These words which are deceptively simple on their
face, have been given a variety of meanings by the courts during the past
forty years. A fragmentary approach to interpretation in the expense, loss and
bad debt sections which did not consider the total context in which the phrase
appeared, has resulted in confusion that, in turn, produced an impressive
amount of litigation and ultimately required legislative intervention. This un-
happy series of events was due primarily to the failure of the Commissioner and
the courts to infuse a policy-content into this troublesome phrase, which is used
throughout the Code in a variety of contexts and for a multitude of purposes.
With rare exceptions the reported opinions indicate that judicial and adminis-
trative decision makers seem to assume that there is a universal and inter-
changeable meaning of "trade or business" that can be assigned to the phrase
wherever it occurs. They have applied a definition of this phrase, arrived at for
the purpose of one section, to other sections with little evidence that the pur-
pose and policy underlying these sections were considered. This judicial and
administrative indifference to legislative history and policy as an important
part of the total context is well illustrated by the checkered history of the phrase
"trade or business" in the expense, loss and bad debt sections of the Internal
Revenue Code.
Application of the approach to interpretation suggested in Section II to the
phrase "trade or business" in the bad debt section illustrates how a systematic
widening of the context of analysis leads to a fluctuation in the tentative mean-
ings assigned to the phrase from context to context. The wording of the entire
bad debt section alone gives little clue as to whether the phrase should be given
a broad or narrow meaning.22 When the context of interpretation is widened to
include consideration of some other relevant sections of the Code, the nar-
row meaning which the courts have attributed to the phrase in these sections
suggests that "trade or business" in the bad debt section should be assigned
a tentative meaning that is narrow in scope. When the context is further
widened to include the legislative history of the bad debt section, there is
a reasonably clear indication that the problem that Congress was attempting
to cope with by introducing the phrase into the bad debt section in 1942
would have best been handled by giving "trade or business" a meaning that
is broad in scope. When the context is widened still further to include poli-
cies embodied in relevant provisions of the Code, the pendulum swings back
again, and a narrow meaning of "trade or business" in the bad debt section
seems more appropriate.
When the phrase "trade or business" was introduced into the bad debt sec-
22 "Broad" meaning is here used to indicate an interpretation of "trade or business" which
includes a greater number of taxpayer activities.
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tion in 1942, it had already acquired a congealed meaning in the loss and ex-
pense provisions of the Code. This meaning should be considered when the
context of analysis is widened to include other relevant provisions of the statute
as well as the literal wording of the entire bad debt section itself. For this rea-
son, the loss and expense sections are the ones that have been examined in de-
tail here; however, a more complete investigation would consider the meaning
that the phrase has been given in over sixty other sections of the Code.
THE CONGEALED MEANING OF "TRADE OR BUSINESS"
EXPENSE AND LOSS SECTIONS
The following analysis of the interpretations of the term "trade or business"
in the expense and loss sections of the code not only shows what meaning has
been assigned to the phrase in these two sections, but also indicates how a dis-
regard of legislative history can lead the courts to an interpretation narrower
than that which seems to have been intended by Congress.
After the Supreme Court held income taxes to be unconstitutional in Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,23 a coalition of insurgent Republicans and Demo-
crats succeeded in passing a law taxing corporate income in 1909.24 To avoid
the provisions which had caused the Supreme Court to strike down the 1894
Income Tax Act, the Corporate Tax Act was worded as an excise tax on the
right to carry on business, measured in amount by the net income of the cor-
poration. In upholding the constitutionality of this tax in Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co.,25 the Supreme Court gave the statute a broad application by defining
"business" broadly as "that which occupies the time, attention and labor of
men for the purpose of a livelihood and profit.., everything about which a
person can be employed."
Encouraged by the broad construction of the 1909 Act and pessimistic over
the fate of the pending Income Tax Amendment to the Constitution, the same
coalition attempted in 1912 to extend the "excise tax" to individuals and part-
nerships as well. The new bill was similarly worded to tax "doing of business"
measured by "net income from whatever source derived."26 The congressional
debates show that "business" was intended here to have the broad application
of the Flint definition, 27 and was to cover even profits derived from the owner-
ship of property or from lending money to individuals or corporations. The tax
was designed to reach all but the "idle holder of idle wealth." 28
In computing net income, the so-called "measure" of the tax, the 1912 bill
would have allowed the deduction of all "necessary expenses actually paid in
23158 U.S. 601 (1895). 2436 Stat. 11 (1909). 25220 U.S. 107 (1911).
2 6 See Bill introduced March 2, 1912, H.R. 21214, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.
27 Id., at §§ I and 2, reproducing verbatim the Flint definition of "trade or business." See
also 48 Cong. Rec. 3505, 3568-70, 3584-3630 (1912) (House), and 48 Cong. Rec. 9681-83,
9694-96 (1912) (Senate).
28 Ibid.
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carrying on any business. '29 The "business" qualification was inserted to insure
that no personal, living or family expenses were deducted. 0 Still thinking in
terms of the broad "constitutional" concept of "business," Congress intended
the deduction to encompass all expenses connected with the production of in-
come.
The "individual excise tax" bill of 1912 had been passed by both the House
and the Senate, and had been referred to a Conference Committee when the
Sixteenth Amendment was enacted. With constitutional obstacles thus re-
moved, Congress abandoned the idea of an excise on profit-seeking activities in
favor of a general tax on net income.
The structure of the 1912 bill, coupled with the 1909 corporate tax law, pro-
vided the foundation for the Income Tax Act of 1913.31 The new act's only
substantial change shifted the tax from a levy on "doing business measured by
net income" to a tax on the net income itself. The provision of the 1912 bill,
allowing individuals to deduct all necessary business expenses, was transferred
verbatim to the new act and coupled with the provision of the 1909 Act allow-
ing corporations to deduct all "ordinary and necessary expenses paid.., in the
maintenance and operation of its business and properties. '3 2 Both sections spoke
of "business" in the light of the meaning set forth in the Flint definition. There
is no indication in either the Committee Reports or the congressional debate
that the phrase as used in the 1913 Act was intended to have a new meaning,
more restricted than or otherwise different from the meaning theretofore as-
signed to that phrase.
At the origin of the income tax law the phrase "trade or business" was, thus,
synonymous with any profit-seeking activity. The phrase was first used to
obviate a constitutional objection to the tax on income, and then, to insure
that living expenses constituting the cost of living were not deducted. There is
no indication that the phrase "trade or business" was used to differentiate be-
tween two kinds of profit-seeking activities.
Problems in interpreting the phrase "trade or business" first arose in connec-
tion with the loss provision of the 1913 Act. The "business" qualification was
originally inserted there, as in the expense section, to distinguish commercial
losses from losses incurred entirely apart from transactions for profit and to
make "a man pay upon.., his actual profit during the year."33 However, the
29 Ibid.
30 Cf. the corresponding provision of the 1913 Act (§ IIB) which was carried over from the
1912 Bill.
31 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, H.R. 3321, Public No. 16, 63d Cong., 1st Sess.
3 Id., at §§ II (B) and II (G). Section 214 (a) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1918 reworded
the deduction to cover "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.. ." (Italics added.)-the wording still used
at present.
3 Ibid.
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Bureau and the courts lost sight of the initial meaning and purpose of the words
"trade or business" and interpreted these words to exclude all losses from
activities not engaged in regularly by the taxpayer, and primarily to exclude
losses on stock speculation. 4 In the Revenue Act of 1916, Congress added a
new provision which allowed a deduction to the taxpayer for losses sustained in
"transactions entered into for profit but not connected with his business or
trade."
One of the first cases35 to attempt a definition of a trade or business expense
refused to follow the narrow precedent of the loss cases and, instead, accepted
the broad definition of "business" set forth in Flint. This interpretation, by and
large, was followed in all expense cases before the late nineteen-thirties.36
The belief that Congress could constitutionally tax only net income seems
to have been implicit in the early decisions which gave a broad interpretation
to "trade or business expenses." Therefore, wherever an activity gave rise to
taxable income, the courts appear to have felt that deductions for all the ex-
penses or losses attributable to that income had to be allowed. However, the
courts later began to assert that deductions were a matter of grace and should
be strictly construed, thus suggesting judicial acceptance of the idea that Con-
gress could tax gross income within the limits of the Sixteenth Amendment. In
keeping with this change in outlook, the phrase "trade or business expenses"
underwent new scrutiny, resulting in a narrowing of its meaning.
The new interpretation injected a qualitative element into the phrase. The
courts now became interested in what the taxpayer does for others-the tax-
payer must hang out a shingle! The first declaration of this new concept of
"business" was set forth in the concurring opinion of Justices Frankfurter and
Reed in Deputy v. Dupont.3 The concurrence stated what it admitted was a
"somewhat novel suggestion": that carrying on any "trade or business" under
the expense section of the Code was confined to holding "one's self out to others
as engaged in the selling of goods or services." (Italics added.) Shortly there-
3' Mente v. Eisner, 266 Fed. 161 (C.A. 2d, 1920). The language of the loss section lent itself
to a narrower interpretation than the expense section. The expense section, which was worded
"any trade or business," permitted a finding that a taxpayer may be engaged in more than
one business; there was no need to bunch the taxpayer's activities into one business. The loss
section, on the other hand, was phrased in terms of "his trade or business" (1913-1917), "the
trade or business" (1919-1934) and finally, just "trade or business," and thus, tended to
connote singularity.
1, Albert M. Briggs, 7 B.T.A. 409 (1927).
1 The main problems litigated in the expense field concerned the expenditures of investors,
fiduciaries and various ventures operated as hobbies. In these areas the courts, and for the
most part, the Bureau interpreted the phrase "trade or business" broadly in determining who
qualified for expense deductions. The position of the Bureau is summed up in 1935 in an
unpublished letter stating that it had "adopted the policy of allowing the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year with respect to the management, pro-
tection and handling of properties producing taxable income."
3T 308 U.S. 488 (1939).
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after, in the celebrated case of Higgins v. Commissioner,3" it was held-this time
by the majority of the Court-that the investment of one's funds could not con-
stitute a business. The Flint definition was rejected as based on the corporation
("excise") tax law and consequently inapplicable to the "dissimilar income tax
field." All prior cases holding personal investment activities to constitute "trade
oFr business" were distinguished as turning on the extent of the taxpayer's par-
ticipation in the management of the corporation in which investments were held.
The ramifications of the Higgins decision 9 were rather severe. Investors
found that while their private investment income was fully taxable, their ex-
penses were deductible only if they could show, in addition to a profit motive and
continuity of activities, that they were "engaged in the selling of goods and serv-
ices." The "business" of speculation for profit vanished as far as the expense
section was concerned. 40 A new category of activities was developed, with fully
taxable income but nondeductible expenses.
Congress promptly acted to correct the inequitable situation that this nar-
row interpretation of the phrase "trade or business" had created. The Revenue
Act of 1942 contaiwd a section providing for the deduction of all ordinary and
necessary expenses incurred in (1) the production or collection of income, or
(2) the management, conservation or maintenance of income producing prop-
erty.
41
38312 U.S. 212 (1941).
39 The Supreme Court in two later decisions further interspersed Justice Frankfurter's
"novel" definition of "business" into the expense field. In City Bank v. Helvering, 313 U.S.
121 (1941), the Court upheld the lower court's determination that the fiduciary activities of
a trustee were those of a "mere" passive investor and did not engage him in "trade or busi-
ness." In United States v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127 (1941), it disallowed a business expense deduc-
tion for legal fees paid by an executor whose activities were directed primarily toward the con-
servation of the assets of an estate.
The two decisions introduced new ambiguities concerning the business status of fiduciaries.
In both cases the Court explained what "trade or business" was not; it decided that the trust
(or estate) activities considered by the Court in these cases did not elevate the fiduciary to the
position of a business trustee (or executor). But this left some important questions undecided.
Should a trustee, in order to be allowed a business expense deduction, be regularly engaged in
a fiduciary capacity as "a matter or business," or would it suffice for him to manage the affairs
of a trust or estate composed of a business or businesses?
40 Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d 556 (C.A. 4th, 1942). As to fiduciaries, their expenses
could not be deducted if their activities centered-as is usually the case-around holding and
safeguarding funds, collections and distribution of income, making investments, and keeping
accounts. Corrigan v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 164 (C.A. 6th, 1946). An additional, vague
"selling of services" was required.
41 After this amendment litigation in this area declined. Except in cases involving fiduci-
aries, in controversies over the deductibility of expenses the taxpayer has usually argued in
the alternative that the expenses were either incurred (1) in the trade or business or (2) in
connection with income-producing property. This, in fact, has made it possible for the courts
to examine only whether or not the transaction was entered into for profit and to allow a
deduction on an affirmative finding to that effect, thereby making a determination of whether
the expense was incurred in a trade or business "unnecessary." Thus, the line between business
expenses and those incurred in other income-producing activities has faded away.
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Thus as in the case of the loss section, the cycle of interpreting the phrase
"trade or business" in the expense section took a full turn. Congress initially
allowed for the deduction of all ordinary and necessary business expenses, sig-
nifying thereby all expenses incurred in the production of income. This broad
interpretation of the term "business" was followed for years before the Supreme
Court limited its meaning to those activities in which taxpayers hold out their
goods or services to others. Congress, in order to accomplish the result that was
originally intended, then set up a new category of non-"trade or business" ex-
penses, which were also made fully deductible.
The history of judicial interpretation of the phrase "trade or business" in
the loss and expense sections illustrates how failure by the courts to consider
the historical background of a statute may lead them to depart from legislative
intent. It is suggested that such judicial waywardness can be minimized if
courts are willing to discipline themselves to interpret words only in the tolal
context in which those words appear. Interpretation from partial context often
misses the mark.
A court using a contextual approach in interpreting "trade or business" in the
loss section would have considered that the words were originally used in the
1912 act with the broad purpose of obviating constitutional objections to the
taxation of all income producing activities. Then, weight would have been
given to the legislative history of the loss deduction section itself. This history
indicates that the provision was enacted to insure that the tax would be levied
only on the net income from all transactions for profit. Furthermore, the amend-
ment to the loss section in 1916 to allow a deduction for losses sustained in
transactions for profit indicates rather clearly that in that section Congress
originally intended to allow a deduction for all losses sustained in any income
producing activities of a taxpayer. In this amendment Congress thus reaffirmed
the policy of taxing net income only. The same comments apply to the narrow
interpretation of trade or business in the expense section by the Supreme Court
in the Higgins case.
The narrow judicial interpretation of "trade or business," which prompted
legislative correction in the expense and loss sections, has been mechanically
imported by the Court into the bad debts section. Once again, giving the phrase
a narrow meaning has had the effect of thwarting the policy that Congress was
apparently seeking to implement in 1942 when it introduced the phrase "trade
or business" into the bad debt section. 42 A contextual approach to interpreta-
tion, which embodies the systematic and tentative characteristics of scientific
42 The distinction between business and nonbusiness debts introduced into Section 166
was aimed at minimizing revenue losses attributable to the fraudulent practice of deducting
intra-family gifts disguised as loans. There is no indication in the legislative history of the 1942
amendment that the phrase "trade or business" was intended to restrict deductions in any
situations, except those involving intra-family gift abuses. The phrase was apparently only
used to distinguish bona fide commercial activity from intra-family gifts.
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method, can help point up the justification (or lack of it) for such results. It
would take into account not only the prior congealed meaning of the words
"trade or business," but also the legislative purpose of the 1942 amendment to
the bad debt section as well as relevant general policies embodied in the entire
statute.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND POLICY: BAD DEBT SECTION
The distinction between business and non-business activities for the pur-
poses of bad debt deductions is of relatively recent vintage. For a long time
litigation in the field of worthless indebtedness was limited to problems of the
appropriate year for deduction and the genuineness of the debtor-creditor rela-
tionship. The distinction between business and non-business debts was intro-
duced in 1942 apparently as a means of minimizing revenue losses attributable
to the fraudulent practice of deducting intra-family gifts disguised as loans.,'
The 1942 Act in effect recognized that it was impossible to detect many such
fraudulent deductions without prohibitive administrative expense. The problem
was solved by dividing loans into those which were likely to be gifts and those
which were not, and by limiting the deductibility of all debts in the suspect
category. 44
In distinguishing between business and non-business bad debts, little atten-
tion was paid to legislative history. Instead, the courts simply applied tests
which had previously been developed in interpreting other sections of the
Code.4" The meaning of trade or business extrapolated from these sections was
narrower than that suggested by the legislative history of the 1942 amend-
ment.
46
The failure to consider the full context and concomitant mechanical importa-
tion of restrictive concepts of trade or business into the bad debt section was
particularly felt in the field of corporate financing. In general, to qualify for a
business bad debt deduction a lender has been required to show either that the
43 H.R. Rep. No. 2,333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1942). The impressive number of pre-1942
cases in which the Treasury has challenged the good faith of alleged loans to relatives demon-
strates that Congress' concern was justified. E.g., Jones, 13 B.T.A. 1271 (1928); Bowles,
1 B.T.A. 584 (1925); Page, 2 B.T.A. 1316 (1925).
44 By allowing only a limited deduction for losses on business debts, the amendment makes
it economical for the Commissioner to forego litigation, thus avoiding a difficult burden of
proof which before 1942 he often failed to sustain. E.g., Redfield v. Eaton, 53 F. 2d 693
(D. Conn., 1931); Ortiz, 42 B.T.A. 173 (1940); Spencer, 21 B.T.A. 859 (1930); Baumann, 8
B.T.A. 107 (1927).
Judging from the small number of cases decided under the 1942 statute, the amendment
has achieved its purpose.
45 See pp. 38-41 supra. Cases interpreting the term "trade or business" in regard to ex-
penses, net operating losses carry-overs, and losses, have been applied by the courts, without
examining their relevance, in the determination of the bad debt cases. See, e.g., Commissioner
v. Stokes' Estate, 200 F.2d 637 (C.A. 8th, 1953); Sage, 15 T.C. 299 (1950).
46 See p. 47 supra.
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debt was acquired "incident to his trade or business" 47 or that he is in the
"business of lending money." 48 Where the loan is to a corporation, the allow-
ance of a full deduction upon worthlessness of that loan is said to depend on
whether the lender is an "active financier" or a "passive investor. ' 49 In mak-
ing this determination the courts generally have not referred to the legislative
history of the 1942 amendment.?0 Originally the inquiry was whether or not the
taxpayer was in the business of "promoting" business ventures,51 not whether
he was in the money lending business. Today most courts merely inquire wheth-
er or not the taxpayer is a professional money lender. 52 The promoter is no longer
an "active financier" entitled to a business bad debt deduction. He has been
shifted to become a mere "passive investor." This shrinking of the concept of
"trade or business" in the bad debt section has prevented many lenders to
corporations from receiving a full deduction from ordinary income, even though
they are clearly not making gifts. The deductibility of losses sustained in many
truly commercial transactions has thus been limited to a capital loss deduction."
The "promoter" theory,54 born in connection with trade or business losses,
has thrived in the field of bad debts. The parenthood of the theory can be at-
tributed to the cases of Washburn v. Comm. and Foss v. Comm."6 In Washburn,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was confronted with the problem of
distinguishing a passive security holder from one whose dealings with certain
corporations were so broad that such dealings could be said to be a "trade or
business" in themselves. In allowing a business loss carry-forward, the court
held that the "taxpayer's income was the result not alone of his investment, but
also of his labor expended in connection with the management of the companies
17 Bart, 21 T.C. 880 (1954); A. Rubel, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. 54241; J. N. Hub-
bard, P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. 52287; Ingersoll, 7 T.C. 34 (1946).
48 Estate of Morris H. Cone, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. 54162. Cf. E. W. Waybright,
P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. 51189. See also Commissioner v. Smith, 203 F.2d 310 (C.A. 2d,
1953).
11 Compare C. Yewdall, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. 54087, with W. C. Byers, P-H
1955 T. C. Meem. Dec. 55045.
50 Only the very first case construing the 1942 amendment made any reference to the pur-
pose behind the distinction between business and non-business debts. Cluett, 8 T.C. 1178
(1947).
11 E.g., Sage, 15 T.C. 299 (1950); Macy, 8 T.C.M. 45 (1949).
52 See, e.g., the leading case of Commissioner v. Smith, 203 F.2d 310 (C.A. 2d, 1953).
61 E.g., Commissioner v. Smith, note 48 supra; J. M. Hickerson, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem.
Dec. 54343; L. F. Crofoot, P-H 1949 T.C. Mem. Dec. 49236; Kalech, 23 T.C. 672 (1955).
In these and other cases no family relationship was involved nor was there any suggestion
that the loans were disguised gifts.
11 See generally Nonbusiness Bad Debt-Is the Taxpayer Getting the Business?, 8 Miami
L.Q. 593 (1954), and an excellent article, Bakst, Bad Debt Treatment of Stockholders Loans
to Closely-Held Corporations, 25 N.Y. Certified Public Accountant 51 (1955).
5551 F.2d 949 (C.A. 8th, 1931) 5675 F.2d 326 (C.A. 1st, 1935).
19571
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
in which he had investments. The combination of the two [was] his vocation. '0 7
Predicated on the Washburn decision, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reached the same conclusion in the Foss case. There, the taxpayer was the holder
of substantial investments in a number of enterprises. He devoted substantial
time to the active management of these companies, maintaining an office for
that purpose. The Court held that Foss was engaged in a business; it described
active financiers as those who associate themselves actively in the enterprises
in which they are financially interested and devote a substantial part of their
time to that work as a matter of business.5 8 Thus, these two circuit courts seem
to have recognized as coming within the "trade or business" concept, the activi-
ties of a taxpayer who actively participated in the management of corporations
in which he had a controlling interest.
In Samuel Lanski, 9 the Tax Court developed a narrower test, which opened
the door to a "promoter" concept of trade or business involving more than the
management of just one or a few corporations. The court noted that the tax-
payer managed only corporations in which he was a substantial stockholder and
lent money only to those corporations, and emphasized that he received income
for his activities only from his capital investment and from his salary as a cor-
porate officer. He did not receive ". . . any bonus, fee, commission or other com-
pensation for promoting the organization of corporations. '" In disallowing a
loss carry-forward of a worthless loan the court held that the taxpayer was
neither in the business of lending money to corporations for a livelihood nor in
the business of -"promoting" corporations. He was merely a manager of cor-
porations, which activity the court did not consider to be a business. Thus
under the holding of Lanski the taxpayer need not be engaged in the business
of lending money; it is, however, necessary that he derive income directly from
promotion (in the form of fees or bonuses) apart from dividends received as an
investor or salary received as a manager. The Washburn and Foss cases, on the
other hand, imply that income from management and investment activities
alone is sufficient to qualify the loans of its recipient as incurred in a "trade or
business." This suggests that in Washburn and Foss management and investing
alone may constitute promoting; but in Lanski, something more is required.
The test applicable in determining who is a business lender is further com-
plicated by an earlier Supreme Court Case. In Burnet v. Clark,6 Justice McReyn-
olds expounded the "separate entity" theory, which is in conflict with the broad
"promoter" test of Washburn and Foss. In that case, the taxpayer was the major-
ity shareholder of a dredging corporation, to the management of which he devoted
6 Washburn v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 949, 951 (C.A. 8th, 1931).
58 Foss v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326, 329 (C.A. 1st, 1935).
59 34 B.T.A. 1019 (1936).
60 Id., at 1026.
61287 U.S. 410 (1932).
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most of his time. He also contributed advice to other business ventures in which
he owned an interest. The impaired financial position of the dredging corpora-
tion impelled Clark, in his desire to preserve his investment, to endorse the
corporation's notes. The carry forward of a substantial loss sustained on one
of these endorsements was disallowed. The Court held that the loss did not re-
sult from the operation of a business and declared that the dredging business
which the taxpayer managed as an officer of the corporation "was not his own."
A corporation and its shareholders and managers are "generally treated as
separate entities." Furthermore, since the taxpayer "was not regularly engaged
in endorsing notes," the endorsement on which the loan was sustained was
merely an occasional transaction.
The implications of the Clark case created difficulties for shareholder-lenders
after the introduction of the "trade or business" concept into the bad debt
section in 1942.12 The Clark case divided the taxpayer's activities into manage-
ment and lending and focused attention solely upon the taxpayer's lending
activities. This set the stage for the holding that the sporadic lending or en-
dorsement of corporate notes is not enough to get the taxpayer into the category
of persons engaged in the business of lending money; thus losses on such loans
are not business loans. On the other hand, a "promoter" theory that looks to the
total activity of the taxpayer in investing, managing and lending with respect
to one or several corporations would accept these activities as the "business of
promoting corporations"-a business separate and apart from the business
in which the corporation is engaged. A single loan incident to promoting cor-
porations would be a business loan even though the taxpayer was not engaged
in the business of lending money. Thus, losses on such loans would be business
losses.
These conflicting views of "trade or business" have congealed into definite
tests, but the choice between them has continuously troubled the courts in the
cases dealing with the bad debts section since its amendment in 1942. Thus,
where the taxpayer takes an active part in the activities of only one or two cor-
porations, the Tax Court has not applied the "promoter" theory, but has used
the Clark "separate entity" doctrine and has regarded loans to these corpora-
tions as non-business debts.3 On the other hand, taxpayers involved with the
62See p. 52 supra.
U See Berwind, 20 T.C. 808 (1953); Bihlmaier, 17 T.C. 620 (1951); Palmer, 17 T.C. '702
(1951). For a case recognizing the contemporaneous existence of both the Washburn and
Clark doctrines, see Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 899 (C.A. 8th, 1950).
The success of the Clark separate entity doctrine in the field of bad debts resulting from
loans to corporations is difficult to understand if the decision in that case is compared to the
liberal approach in the line of cases which have held that, for the purpose of deducting ex-
penses, an officer or director of a corporation is engaged in the business of "acting in that capac-
ity." Commissioner v. People's Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (C.A. 3d, 1932); Hochschild
v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 817 (C.A. 2d, 1947); Daily Journal Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d
687 (C.A. 9th, 1943); Hurt, 30 B.T.A. 653 (1934); Holmes, 37 B.T.A. 865 (1938). See also
Guterman, Some Problems of Bad Debts, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 832, 837 (1950).
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management of a number of corporations have been able to successfully invoke
the Washburn-Foss liberal test of "trade or business." Thus, in instances where
substantial time had been given to managing corporations or other ventures,
such activity has been regarded as a business in itself and the Clark case dis-
tinguished.6
4
Pinpointing the confines of the "separate entity" and "promoter" doctrines
had been sufficiently difficult for courts and tax practitioners. The arrival of
Weldon D. Smith v. Comm.'5 on the scene in 1952 has added to the confusion.6
In that case the taxpayer was an investor, manager and creditor in a number of
business enterprises, to one of which he had made substantial loans. Yet, only
a non-business bad debt deduction was allowed. The court held that "since each
of these activities separately does not constitute a business, we cannot see how
a combination of them spread over various businesses can alter the result. Of
course, if respondent were regularly engaged in lending money to business en-
terprises, bad debt losses resulting therefrom would be incurred in his busi-
ness."67
According to the Smith case then, it is not sufficient for the taxpayer to be
regularly engaged in the full-time management and promotion of business en-
terprises. In order to obtain a business bad debt deduction, he must hold
himself out as a money lender. The activities he carries on must be similar in
nature to those of banks and other financial institutions. In this respect the
Smith and Clark cases are alike. They both applied the money-lender test to
determine whether or not the taxpayer qualified for a business deduction. How-
ever, there is an important difference between the two cases. The Clark case did
not exclude the possibility of a "promoter" test as an alternative to the "money-
lender" test. The Smith case, on the other hand, emphatically rejects the "pro-
moter" test, and adopts "money-lending" as the exclusive test of business debts
in the field of corporate financing. The Second Circuit, thus, extended the Clark
doctrine to disallow an ordinary loss deduction in all "promoter" cases where
the taxpayer is not also a money-lender (which is the bulk of "promoter"
cases) .6
Following the Smith case, the courts' acceptance of the "promoter" theory
has become increasingly unpredictable. 9 While recognizing the theory's con-
64 E.g., Campbell, 11 T.C. 510 (1948); Macy, 8 T.C.M. 45 (1949); Sage, 15 T.C. 299 (1950);
Hanna, 10 T.C.M. 566 (1951). See also Commissioner v. Stokes' Estate, 200 F.2d 637 (C.A.
3d, 1953).
65203 F.2d 310 (C.A. 2d, 1953). 66 See Bratton, 12 T.C.M. 747 (1953).
67 Commissioner v. Smith, 203 F.2d 310, 312 (C.A. 2d, 1953).
68 See the cases cited note 64 supra. Compare J. Mark, 1951 P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 51225
(taxpayer who organized twelve corporations held to be a "promoter") with J. Weather, 1955
P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 55104 (where on the authority of Smith, the Tax Court held in a
similar context that the taxpayer was merely a "man investing and managing in his own
businesses"). See also Baum, 13 T.C.M. 853 (1954).
69 See note 68 supra and cases there cited.
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tinued viability,7 ° the Tax Court has tended to regard it as applicable only in
the "exceptional" case.7' Thus, a recent Tax Court opinion disallowed a deduc-
tion from ordinary income to a taxpayer who actively managed eighteen cor-
porations and participated in the administration of many more.72 Greater em-
phasis has been placed on whether the taxpayer was regularly engaged in the
business of money lending. Some cases have further narrowed the "promoter"
doctrine by requiring extensive promotional activities during the same taxable
year in which the debt became worthless.7 3
Not all of the Circuit Courts agree with the Second Circuit's restriction on
what constitutes trade or business. Recently the Tax Court's implementation
in Vincent C. Gilblin7 4 of the Smith decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit
in a strongly worded opinion that seems to give a new twist to the "promoter"
theory. The taxpayer was a lawyer who had financed and actively managed at
least nine ventures between 1925 and 1945. He had made loans to Stag Bar,
Inc., which resulted in losses that he wished to deduct as a business bad debt.
He had not, however, made any other loans. Since under the Smith case the com-
bination of the taxpayer's promotional or managerial activities with respect to
his different ventures would not have constituted a "business" any more than
his separate activity in connection with Stag Bar, the Tax Court disregarded
the "promoter" argument. Evidence did not show that the taxpayer was regu-
larly engaged in the business of money lending during the taxable year and,
thus, he was not allowed an ordinary deduction. On appeal the Fifth Circuit
ignored the Smith decision and chided the Tax Court for missing the point of
the taxpayer's argument. The fact that the taxpayer had loaned money to only
one enterprise was not determinative of the case. According to the appellate
court, "[pletitioner's right to deduct the amount of the cancelled debt depends
not upon his showing, as the Tax Court seemed to think, that he was in the
business of lending money, but rather that he was regularly engaged in the
business of 'dealing in enterprises.'... " After citing some of the promoter
cases, the Circuit Court concluded that the taxpayer was engaged in the busi-
ness of seeking out business opportunities, organizing and financing them, con-
tributing to them his time and energy and then disposing of them either at a
profit or loss. The court stated that to hold that the bad debt of such a dealer
in enterprises "was not suffered in the course of his engaging in a trade or busi-
ness, would be to apply a sterile and rigid approach that is not contemplated
by the statute. '75 Thus, there is a head-on conflict in the circuit courts as to
the appropriate test of what constitutes trade or business for purpose of the
bad debt section. The resolution of this conflict requires an examination of the
policies competing for recognition in the field of corporate financing. Policy too,
70 Schomburg, 13 T.C.M. 234 (1954). 73 Fuller, 21 T.C. 407 (1953).
71 Berind, 20 T.C. 808 (1953). 74 227 F.2d 692 (C.A. 5th, 1955).
72 Ibid. 75 Id., at 695, 698.
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must be taken into account in a contextual approach to interpretation, as well
as legislative history and congealed meaning of words.
Three policies appear particularly pertinent: Equalization of the treatment
of investment losses irrespective of their form, equalization of the treatment of
investment losses irrespective of whether the loss is upon the disposition of the
investment or upon worthlessness, and finally, equalization of the treatment of
losses with that of gains.
An individual organizes one corporation, subscribes to a large share of its
stock, takes its long-term notes in return for personal loans, and actively par-
ticipates in its management as president. Usually he receives no fee or bonus as
recompense for his organizational activity. He derives income from the enter-
prise in two capacities. As an investor he receives interest on his loans and, as
the corporation prospers, dividends on his stock. As a manager he receives his
salary and bonuses. To the extent that the corporation prospers by his efforts,
he is rewarded by increased dividends and compensation as manager. Since an
established principle of income taxation requires that the affairs of the tax-
payer and his closely held corporation be kept separate, the taxpayer may not
consider the corporation's business as his own. But, suppose that the taxpayer
has twelve corporations rather than one. His relationship to each as investor
and manager has not changed qualitatively by reason of there being twelve.
His income continues to be derived in the same two capacities; no new source or
form of income develops by virtue of his managing and investing in a large num-
ber of corporations. In short, the taxpayer is doing nothing different with re-
spect to his twelve corporations than he had been doing with respect to his first.
He is only doing the same thing, but for more corporations. The promoter doc-
trine, as applied by the courts to allow ordinary deductions to qualifying tax-
payers, appears to be the psychological embodiment of a purely quantitative
phenomenon.
The numerical test required by the "promoter" doctrine is both artificial and
discriminatory.7 6 If the taxpayer organizes and lends money to one large cor-
poration with twelve branches in different areas, his loans, should they become
worthless, would only be entitled to treatment as capital losses. But if he
should organize and actively manage twelve separate corporations, under the
promoter theory, losses on his loans would be entitled to a business bad debt
deduction. 7 Further, so long as several ventures are organized, it matters not
(for the majority of cases, at least). whether this is done in or around the taxable
year or over a period of many years.7 8 Thus the "promoter" who organizes a
single venture after a period of quiescence is given more advantageous tax treat-
ment than the non-promoter who does precisely the same thing but for the first
time. Generally, the promoter doctrine discriminates against the novice and the
small-scale organizer who has only a few corporations in favor of the big and ex-
76 See note 79 infra.
77 See, e.g., Campbell, 11 T.C. 510 (1948). 78 See case cited note 74 supra.
[Vol. 25
SYSTEMATIC DRAFTING AND INTERPRETING
perienced operator who organizes many.79 The inequities of this doctrine ap-
pear unjustifiable.
Furthermore, the promoter doctrine frustrates the policy, expressed in sec-
tion 165(g) of the Code, equating the treatment of losses suffered on the worth-
lessness of capital assets that are investments in corporations with losses
suffered on the disposition of such assets.80 At present a loss suffered upon the
sale of notes by a promoter is treated as a capital loss." However, losses suffered
upon the worthlessness of notes held by that same taxpayer are allowed as de-
ductions from ordinary income under the promoter theory.82
71 A comparison of several cases illustrates the point. Business bad debt allowed: Campbell,
11 T.C. 510 (1948) (taxpayer owned and financed twelve corporations); Jacob Mark, 1951
P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 51225 (taxpayer financed twelve retail coal businesses); Macy, 8
T.C.M. 45 (1949) (taxpayer organized over twenty corporations); Macy, 8 T.C.M. 713 (1949)
(similar). Only non-business bad debt deduction allowed: Boissevain, 17 T.C. 325 (taxpayer
organized, promoted, financed and managed only one corporation); Fred R. Angevine, 1951
P-H T.C. Mee. Dec. 51319 (same); Wallace L. Cheshire, 1952 P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 52042
(taxpayer was stockholder and officer of several corporations, but financed and made loans to
only one of them); William Bernstein, 1952 P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 52031 (lawyer and ac-
countant promoted and managed only one corporation); J. Terry Huffstutler, 1954 P-H
T.C. Mem. Dec. 54000 (loan by stockholder to corporation-he promoted three or four
corporations, but financed only two and made loans only to one).
1 This policy was explicitly incorporated into the Code in the Revenue Act of 1938. The
Report by the Ways and Means Subcommittee, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 45, H. Rep. Jan. 14,
1938, states:
"Under the existing law losses resulting from the fact of stock or securities becoming worth-
less are permitted to be deducted in full from gross income, without regard to the provisions
of section 117 of the Revenue Act of 1936, which as now drawn apply only to losses resulting
from the sale or exchange of capital assets....
"It is the purpose of the above recommendation to remove this anomaly in existing law (ex-
cept in the case of a dealer in securities) by henceforth subjecting losses sustained by reason of
corporate securities having become worthless to the same limitations as losses realized on the
sale or exchange of such securities."
"I A loss on the sale of a note is considered a loss from the "sale or exchange" of a capital
asset. E.g., E. Reynal, 1955 P-H T.C. MIem. Dec. 55078; Lehr, 18 T.C. 373 (1952); Perkins,
41 B.T.A. 1225, 1231 (1940). See also Parke v. Commissioner, 1956 P-H Fed. 72809. (C.A.
8th, 1956).
Prior to the 1954 code even accounts and notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course
of business were capital assets unless held by a person in the business of selling notes and
accounts. See, e.g., Levy, 46 B.T.A. 423 (1942); Graham Mill & Elevator Co. v. Thomas,
152 F.2d 564 (C.A. 5th, 1945); Hilton, 13 T.C. 623 (1949); Lehr, 18 T.C. 373 (1952). This was
changed by the 1954 Code. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1221(4), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1221(4) (1954).
It is possible, however, that after the decision of the Supreme Court in Corn Products Re-
fining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), losses suffered by a lender or a promoter upon
disposition of his notes may be treated as ordinary losses even though realized by a taxpayer
who is not in the business of selling notes. The Corn Products case held that a gain or loss
upon the disposition of an asset acquired by the taxpayer in connection with his trade or busi-
ness is an ordinary gain or loss even where the asset disposed of was not held for sale to cus-
tomers or does not otherwise fit within any of the exceptions to the definitions of a capital
asset in § 1221 of the Code. Both the money lender and the promoter (where the promoter
doctrine is recognized) acquire debt instruments as a consequence of their business, although
they may not customarily sell such instruments. See also note 83 infra.
82 When a note becomes worthless, there is no "sale or exchange" and, therefore, no appli-
cation of the capital loss section of the Code. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1211. For this reason,
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The broader policy consideration of equalizing the tax consequences of in-
vestment losses irrespective of their paper-form ("stock or securities" as dis-
tinguished from notes) also weighs against the traditional promoter doctrine.
Professional money-lenders hold instruments evidencing indebtedness (includ-
ing notes or bonds) as an incident of their business. While held simply as a nec-
essary incident to such a trade or business of lending money, an instrument
evidencing a debt should be, and now is,83 considered a business asset and en-
titled to ordinary deduction upon worthlessness. This situation should be dis-
tinguished from that of the promoter whose loans in the form of notes, bonds or
open account are a part of his investment program in several closely-held cor-
porations that he actively manages. Viewed as investments in a controlled cor-
poration the loans of this "promoter," whether evidenced by note or an open
account, are indistinguishable from bonds defined as "securities" by Code Sec-
tion 165 (g) (2).84 Yet, worthlessness of a security would result in a capital loss
even though held by a promoter," whereas worthlessness of a long-term note held
by that same person results in a full deduction. 6 No reason appears why the
promoter should receive such disparate treatment depending simply on the form
he chooses to express his creditor relationship with his enterprise.87 In addition,
the promoter takes advantage of the present unrealistic debt-stock dichotomy
to further thwart the policy of equalizing the tax treatment of investment losses
irrespective of their paper-form. Even though a debt issue to the promoter may
if Congress would decide to treat all worthless loans not acquired in trade or business as capital
assets, it would have to include in effect all instruments evidencing loans within § 165 (g).
At present this subsection defines "security" as including only some instruments of indebted-
ness. Such instruments that are not in registered form or do not bear interest coupons are not
included.
81 This is certainly so in the case of notes held by a money lender. Cf. Commissioner v.
Smith, 203 F.2d 310 (C.A. 2d, 1953).
Even worthless bonds, defined as "securities" by § 165 (g) of the 1954 Code, may receive
ordinary loss treatment if held by a money lender. Section 165 (g) gives capital loss treatment
to a loss sustained on the worthlessness of a security "which is a capital asset." As pointed out
in note 75 supra, a bond held by a lender may be considered a business rather than a capital
asset under the authority of the Corn Products case. However, the implications of this Su-
preme Court decision upon the field of debt financing have not as yet been explored.
114Loss Deductions for Quasi-Investors: 23(e) v. 23(k) v. 117, 63 Yale L. J. 862 (1954).
85 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 165 (g). But see also note 83 supra.
86 See, e.g., Campbell, 11 T.C. 510 (1948).
87 From the point of view of § 1221 of the Code, debt instruments are capital or business
assets irrespective of their form (notes or bonds). Hence, in addition to the fact that bonds
and notes held by a promoter are indistinguishable when viewed as investments in a controlled
corporation, the capital asset section similarly commends uniform treatment of bonds and
notes. However, in correlating the treatment of losses upon disposition with treatment of
losses on the worthlessness of investment "which are capital assets," § 165 (g) does not include
most notes. Thus, most worthless notes, which are also capital assets, may receive ordinary
loss treatment under the business bad debt provision of § 166.
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sometimes be economically and financially justifiable, more often the issue of
debt instead of stock has merely a tax-saving motive.88
Although the credit for dividends received provisions, 9 the "thin capitaliza-
tion" doctrine9" and unwillingness to clog the corporation's credit position may
operate as deterrents, the tax advantages of debt to such closely held corpora-
tions are sizable. The redemption of an original debt issue may be used as a
profit "bail-out" device by those in control of a prosperous corporation.9
Moreover, since interest is deductible to the corporation, 2 while dividends are
not, there is an additional tax incentive to having the corporation issue debts.
instead of stock. Thus, certain personal tax advantages will ensue to those or-
ganizers who are creditors as well as stockholders of the corporation. The allow-
ance to the promoter of full deduction of worthless loans to closely held cor-
porations adds another such incentive. For, if the corporation should fail, the
promoter, insofar as he has chosen to invest in the form of debt, will be able to
write off his loss against ordinary income. On the other hand, to the extent
that he has invested in stock, he will be allowed only a capital loss deduction
for his dissipated investment."
The promoter theory also frustrates the still broader policy of equalizing the
treatment of income with the treatment of losses. The traditional promoter
does not derive income directly attributable to his promotional services. He
does not receive fees or bonuses for promotion but derives his income from shar-
ing in the prosperity of the corporation through salaries, dividends and interest.
8 The artificiality of the debt-stock categorization in the field of closely held corporations
is well illustrated by the recent developments of the "thin capitalization" doctrine. There is
a judicial trend toward the conclusion that bonds and other evidences of indebtedness are not
bona fide if issued to the corporation's shareholders in exchange for assets required to get the
business under way. Miller, 24 T.C. 923 (1955); Schnitzer, 13 B.T.C. 43 (1949). If, on the
other hand, the purpose of the loan is to provide for "working capital," a valid debt may be
recognized. Rowan v. United States 219 F.2d 51 (C.A. 5th, 1955). Generally it would seem
that under the present formulation of the "thin capitalization" theory, a shareholder can be
a creditor of his corporation only if he is the psychological equivalent of an independent lender
furnishing "working capital." Furthermore, in the opinion of some reputable judges, a relation-
ship of control between lender and borrower would almost necessarily lead to the conclusion
of a "lack of indebtedness in the ordinary sense, i.e., a debt whose non-payment leads to fore-
closure or attachment and execution." See dissent by Judge Clark in Kraft Foods Company
v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (C.A. 2d, 1956). For an excellent discussion of these problems
see Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 Taxes 830 (1956).
19 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 34.
90 See Comment, Thin Capitalization and Tax Avoidance, 55 Col. L. Rev. 1054 (1955).
91 The redemption of stock at capital gain rates is subject to substantial limitations. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954 § 302. See Dean, Rules Governing Preferred Stock Bail-Outs, 14 N.Y.U.
Inst. of Fed. Taxation 691 (1956). The attribution of stock ownership rules of § 318 of the
1954 Code introduces further complications. See Laiken, Stock Redemptions; Section 302 and
318, 14 N.Y.U. Inst. of Fed. Taxation 671 (1956). The repayment of a loan does not encounter
these limitations.
921nt. Rev. Code of 1954 § 163.
93Id., at § 165 (g).
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Subjectively such a promoter will usually expect to continue getting his periodic
share of the profits of his corporation. He does not organize and invest in a busi-
ness with a view to soon dispose of it. He is in to stay.94 His holdings in that
business are not "stock in trade."95 If and when such a promoter disposes of his
holdings, either by causing the corporation to sell its assets and dissolve or by
selling his stock in that corporation, any gain realized should be-as it now is-
treated as a gain on the disposition of a capital asset. Likewise, any loss sus-
tained from the disposition or worthlessness of such holdings should be treated
as a capital loss. At present, however, where the promoter theory is accepted,
only losses on securities are limited to a capital loss deduction; losses on worth-
less debts are allowed a deduction from ordinary income to taxpayers who quali-
fy as promoters. 6
In America today there has emerged a new type of financier who does not
fit the description of the traditional promoter. He is the rare "dealer in enter-
prises." Although salaries, interest and dividends from his businesses may be
sources of revenue to him, they are sources that he seeks to avoid. The revenue
he is after is that resulting from gains on the disposition of his investments. He
invests, organizes, combines and divides in order to sell. He does not get into
a corporation to stay in; he gets in to get out. For such a "deal[erl in enter-
prises" 97 investments are stock in trade. Therefore, both gains from the dis-
position of his investments and losses from either worthlessness or dis-
position of such investments should be treated alike-as ordinary gains99 or
losses from the disposition or worthlessness of a business asset.99 Thus, if the
promoter theory is discarded as in the Smith case, such a dealer in businesses
would still be allowed an ordinary deduction on losses sustained upon worth-
lessness of debts even though he is not a money-lender.
Viewed from the above perspectives the promoter theory results in inequity
and inconsistency of tax treatment. It frustrates important tax policies; and its
vagueness creates uncertainty and invites litigation.
The legislative history of the 1942 amendment to the bad debt section sug-
gests that the primary purpose of that amendment was to minimize the revenue
losses from the fraudulent practice of deducting intra-family gifts disguised as
94 See, e.g., Campbell, 11 T.C. 510 (1948).
91 They are not held for sale in the course of a business of buying and selling corporations.
See case cited note 94 supra.
96 See, e.g., case cited note 94 supra.
17 See Giblin v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 692, 695 (C.A. 5th, 1955).
18 With respect to gains upon disposition of securities by one who is not a "dealer" in such
securities, ordinary income treatmeit would constitute an important departure from existing
law. But, after all, why should a dealer in enterprises receive a treatment more favorable than
the one accorded the dealer in real estate, for instance?
99 At least, if such a dealer's gains are to continue to be treated as capital gains, then his
losses should only be treated as capital losses.
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loans. 00 In the field of corporate financing, the courts can effectuate that limited
purpose of the 1942 amendment only by interpreting the phrase, "trade or busi-
ness," in the broadest manner, identifying trade or business as any lending to
corporations for profit.'0' In this respect, the decisions applying the "promoter"
theory of the Washburn-Foss cases better implement the apparently limited
purpose of the 1942 amendment than decisions following the approach of the
Smith case.0 2
However, it is not entirely clear that the 1942 Amendment was aimed only
at intra-family gifts. In a recent Supreme Court decision,' 3 Justice Brennan
pointed out that intra-family gifts were only one example of the kind of
deductions that the amendment was intended to disallow. According to the
majority of the Court the amendment was "equally... suited to put non-
business investments in the form of loans on a footing with other non-
business investments."'' 4 Along with these indications that the 1942 Amend-
ment was designed to do more than just disallow ordinary deduction to intra-
family gifts, the opinion in the Putnam case declares that the amendment had
a further purpose-raising of revenue. 5
The phrase "trade or business" was used in the bad debt section after that
phrase had been interpreted in other provisions of the Code. As interpreted in
the expense and loss sections, the investment of one's funds, by itself, did not
constitute a "trade or business." The phrase "trade or business" was confined
to "holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or serv-
ices."'06 Such a narrow meaning regarding "trade or business" as something
more than transactions for profit, would disallow ordinary deduction for losses
on some truly commercial loans to corporations 10 7 along with disguised intra-
family gifts.
110 See p. 48 supra.
I1 However, as regards loans to individuals an interpretation of "trade or business" as
coextensive with loans for profit would reintroduce the difficulties of proof encountered by the
Commissioner prior to the 1942 Amendment. Intra-family gifts could easily be disguised as
loans which stipulate for the payment of interest (profit). Thus, it appears that the use of the
phrase "trade or business" was an inept tool for preventing the deduction of intra-family gifts
as bad debts, without also disallowing deduction for losses sustained in genuinely commercial
transactions. If this was its sole purpose, the amendment should have been more narrowly
worded to disallow ordinary deduction only for losses sustained on loans to members of the
taxpayer's family.
1o2See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
103 Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 91 (1956).
104 Thus, the Report by the Ways and Means Committee, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Rep.
2333 states that "the determination [as to whether a loan results in a business debt] is sub-
stantially the same as that which is made for the purpose of ascertaining whether a loss from
the type of transaction covered by [the loss section] is incurred in 'trade or business ..... "
105 Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
101 See p. 46 supra. 107 See note 52 supra.
19571
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Because of this ambiguity in meaning in the context which includes legisla-
tive history and congealed meaning, it is appropriate, according to the scien-
tific theory of interpretation outlined in the previous section, to attribute rela-
tively heavy weight to policy considerations in determining the appropriate
meaning to be given the phrase "trade or business" in the bad debt section. At
this level it becomes apparent that assigning a broad meaning to "trade or
business" in the bad debt section would frustrate the three important tax poli-
cies of equalizing treatment of losses upon worthlessness of indebtedness with
losses upon disposition, of treating all investment alike irrespective of paper-
form, and of equalizing treatment of income with treatment of losses.'"' The
interpretation of "trade or business" in the bad debt section which substantially
implements these policies would regard only the loans of money-lenders of the
Smith type as business loans.1"9 The concept of "trade or business" enunciated
by judge Clark in the Smith case, rejecting the promoter theory, is the most ap-
propriate interpretation of the phrase for purposes of the bad debt section.
Thus, as the context of interpretation is broadened the appropriate meaning to
be assigned to "trade or business" shifts from a narrow concept when only prior
use of the phrase is considered to a broader concept when the context is ex-
panded to include legislative history; and finally, back to a narrow concept
when the context is further expanded to take policy into account.
If courts are reluctant to follow the Smith case, the achievement of these im-
portant tax policies will require legislative intervention codifying the Smith
case. This can be done by amending Sections 166, 165 (g) and 1221. The "trade
or business" qualification would be deleted from the bad debt section, and sec-
tion 165 (g) would be broadened to include all evidences of indebtedness which
are capital assets under Section 1221. Thus, a loss on the worthlessness of a
loan will be allowed an ordinary deduction only if that loan qualifies as a busi-
ness asset under Section 1221. That section would be amended to exclude any
evidence of indebtedness acquired in the ordinary course of business from the
definition of a capital asset.
Such amendments will not eliminate the problem of determining which
debts are "trade or business" debts. However, shifting all such determinations
to the capital asset section does assure uniform treatment of investments in cor-
porations throughout the entire code. Since these amendments would synchro-
nize Section 165 with Section 1221, any determination of what constitutes a
business asset under Section 1221 would control the deduction allowed under
Section 165. Furthermore, since the amended Section 165 would cover all evi-
108 See pp. 54-58 supra.
109 Under the Smith case a professional money lender receives ordinary loss treatment upon
worthlessness as well as disposition of both his notes and bonds since § 165 (g) does not apply
to investments which are not capital assets. In the hands of a professional money lender such
investments can be inventory items held in the ordinary course of business. Similarly, gains
(if any) on the disposition of paper representing indebtedness will be taxed at ordinary income
rates. See the Corn Products case discussed in note 81 supra.
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dences of indebtedness, as well as stock, a taxpayer's total investment in a
corporation would be treated alike irrespective of its paper-form as equity capi-
tal or as debt.
Whether or not a taxpayer's investment is a business asset or a capital asset
would turn on whether or not that investment is in his hands "stock in trade"
under Section 1221 (1). Thus, the determination of whether or not an ordinary
deduction should be allowed for a loss sustained on a worthless debt would de-
pend on whether or not the loan is "stock in trade" in the hands of the tax-
payer. These amendments would allow ordinary deductions for losses on loans
suffered by professional money-lenders of the type required by the Smith case,
as well as by professional dealers in businesses whose loans are only an integral
part of their comprehensive program of investment in corporations, which are
their stock in trade. On the other hand, losses sustained by the traditional pro-
moter of the JVashburn type, whose investments are not his "stock in trade,"
would get only capital loss treatment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Symbolic logic is not a miracle tool that will accomplish tasks of analysis
that no other approach can duplicate. In some simple situations the English
language can be just as effective a tool for analysis. However, as complexity in-
creases, symbolic logic can do relatively effortlessly tasks that would be formid-
able projects if analyzed in a natural language. This is a difference that it is
only reasonable to expect between language systems that are carefully con-
structed according to precise rules and languages that have evolved rather hap-
hazardly with the growth of the community. It is in dealing with complex situa-
tions that symbolic logic will justify the time required for lawyers to train
themselves in its use.
One of the first things that beginning students of symbolic logic learn is the
propositional calculus. The system that is here called "systematic-pulveriza-
tion" is merely an adaptation of propositional calculus into notation that is
likely to be more familiar to lawyers. Even the elementary notions of symbolic
logic in the propositional calculus prove to be an incisive tool for cutting
through the ambiguity that characterizes so much of legal writing. We hope
that this article has made apparent the relevance of modern logic as a tool for
improving the communication skills of lawyers.
Practicing lawyers will find systematic-pulverization useful in their everyday
work. It can serve as a convenient reminder that will help a draftsman to be
clear when he intends to be clear. It will help assure that any ambiguity incor-
porated in written documents is not inadvertent, but intentional. Furthermore,
systematic-pulverization can help spotlight ambiguity in documents that have
been written by others in a natural language so that the advocate can be more
fully aware of the possible range of interpretations that he can argue for his
client. Certainly, such skills in handling words are valuable assets to lawyers.
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With the transformation of legal communications into a more systematic
form will come another advantage. Lawyers will be able to enlist the talents of
computing machines in the analysis of some of their more complicated problems.
Machines can handle some of the "logical" aspects of a problem and some
of the routine information retrieval operations, freeing the lawyer to concen-
trate his attention on the more difficult aspect involving judgment, which is the
part of a problem that actually requires human thinking.
It seems reasonable to assert that law schools will begin to do a more effective
job in developing communication skills among law students whenever symbolic
logic gains a place in the crowded curriculum of legal education. Furthermore,
it seems reasonable to predict that it will gain such a place because of its rele-
vance for drafting and interpretation, two of the basic skills of a lawyer. There
has been much discussion about and effort devoted to integrating law and social
science. We suggest that these efforts should be broadened to include inquiry by
legal scholars into the startling developments that have occurred in recent years
in modem logic and related fields.
In sum, we think that the precision and clarity provided by symbolic logic
can help lawyers in their thinking:
The usefulness of modern logic lies not in its capacity to provide answers to the
difficult questions arising in law, but in the extent to which it
-brings to light the precise issues which have to be faced in such questions
-permits these issues to be formulated in relatively precise and unambiguous terms
-marks the limits within which a situation is open for judicial choice and discre-
tion.110
If even the elementary notions of propositional calculus can be so useful to
lawyers, what will the complete apparatus of symbolic logic do? The answers to
this question constitute the research task that lies ahead."'
110 H. L. A. Hart has described common sense in these same words. Hart & Honor6, Causa-
tion in the Law. I-A Survey of Common Sense Principles, 72 L.Q. Rev. 58 (1956).
"I The systems of logic that seem likely to prove most useful to lawyers are those called
"modal" logics. It has recently been demonstrated that the logical systems called "deontic"
logics, which deal with the prescriptive concepts of "obligation," "forbidden" and "permis-
sion," are equivalent to extensions of alethic modal logic systems. See Anderson, The Formal
Analysis of Normative Systems (Tech. Rep. No. 2, Contract SAR/Nonr-609(16), Office of
Naval Research, Group Psychology Branch, 1956).
